c. 5th century BC 2026
This is an AI modernization of The Art of War into contemporary English. The original is available from Project Gutenberg. Also available as an epub.
The Art of War is thirteen short chapters, about six thousand Chinese characters in the original. Tradition gives it to Sun Tzu, a general in the service of the king of Wu in the fifth century BC. Scholars have argued for a long time about whether he existed and how much of the text is his. What is not in question is that Chinese soldiers were reading it by the third century AD and have gone on reading it ever since.
It is not a manual of drill or of battlefield tactics. Its argument is that war ruins the state that wages it, that no country has ever yet profited from a long one, and that the whole business therefore turns on knowing more than the other side and moving before he is ready. The most quoted line in it says that to win a hundred battles out of a hundred is not the height of skill; the height of skill is to break the enemy's resistance without fighting.
Two things about this edition need saying first. It is a modernization of an English translation and not a translation from the Chinese, because nobody working on this collection reads classical Chinese. What has been made readable here is the version Lionel Giles published in 1910. Giles was a sinologist at the British Museum and the son of the Giles of the Wade-Giles spelling system, which is why the names here are Ts'ao Kung and Tu Mu rather than Cao Cao and Du Mu.
The second thing is that more than half of this book was not written by Sun Tzu. Giles printed the classical commentary alongside the text, and that is the reason to read his edition rather than one of the many that give the bare verses. Eleven commentators appear. The earliest is Ts'ao Kung, who is Cao Cao, the warlord of the Three Kingdoms; he annotated the book around AD 200, and once sentenced himself to death under his own order against damaging standing crops. Tu Mu was a poet of the Tang. The others are officials and soldiers of later dynasties. They gloss Sun Tzu, they illustrate him out of the histories, and they contradict him and each other, sometimes rudely.
Three voices share the page, and the page labels them. A numbered verse is Sun Tzu. A paragraph beginning "Commentary" is somebody else, usually a commentator named in its first words, sometimes Giles explaining what the commentators are fighting about. A paragraph beginning "Footnote" is always Giles, who is an Edwardian scholar with opinions, a weakness for comparisons to Napoleon and Cromwell, and several of the best remarks in the book.
Chapter Three: Attack by Stratagem
Chapter Four: Tactical Dispositions
Chapter Six: Weak Points and Strong
Chapter Eight: Variation of Tactics
Chapter Nine: The Army on the March
Chapter Eleven: The Nine Situations
Chapter Twelve: The Attack by Fire
Chapter Thirteen: The Use of Spies
Commentary: Ts'ao Kung, defining what the Chinese title of this chapter means, says it refers to the deliberations held in the temple set aside for the general's temporary use — or, as we should say, in his tent. See verse 26.
1. Sun Tzu said: The art of war is of vital importance to the State.
2. It is a matter of life and death, a road either to safety or to ruin. It is therefore a subject of inquiry that can on no account be neglected.
3. The art of war is governed by five constant factors, all of which must be taken into account when you are working out the conditions you will meet in the field.
4. They are: (1) the Moral Law; (2) Heaven; (3) Earth; (4) the Commander; (5) Method and discipline.
Commentary: What follows suggests that by "Moral Law" Sun Tzu means a principle of harmony, not unlike the Tao of Lao Tzu in its moral aspect. One might be tempted to translate it as "morale", if it were not treated here as an attribute of the ruler in verse 13.
5, 6. The Moral Law brings the people into complete accord with their ruler, so that they will follow him regardless of their lives, undismayed by any danger.
Commentary: Tu Yu quotes Wang Tzu: "Without constant practice, the officers will be nervous and undecided when the army musters for battle; without constant practice, the general will waver and hesitate when the crisis comes."
7. Heaven means night and day, cold and heat, times and seasons.
Commentary: The commentators, I think, make an unnecessary mystery of two words here. Meng Shih takes them to refer to "the hard and the soft, waxing and waning" of Heaven. Wang Hsi may be right, though, in saying that what is meant is "the general economy of Heaven" — the five elements, the four seasons, wind and clouds, and the rest of it.
8. Earth means distances, great and small; danger and security; open ground and narrow passes; the chances of life and death.
9. The Commander stands for the virtues of wisdom, sincerity, benevolence, courage and strictness.
Commentary: The five cardinal virtues of the Chinese are (1) humanity or benevolence; (2) uprightness of mind; (3) self-respect, self-control, or "proper feeling"; (4) wisdom; (5) sincerity or good faith. Here "wisdom" and "sincerity" come before "humanity or benevolence", and the two military virtues of "courage" and "strictness" are substituted for "uprightness of mind" and "self-respect, self-control, or proper feeling".
10. Method and discipline means the marshalling of the army into its proper subdivisions, the gradations of rank among the officers, the maintenance of the roads by which supplies reach the army, and the control of military spending.
11. Every general should be familiar with these five heads. He who knows them will win; he who does not will fail.
12. Therefore, in your deliberations, when you are trying to determine the military conditions, make them the basis of a comparison, in this way:
13. (1) Which of the two rulers has the Moral Law on his side?
Commentary: That is, "is in harmony with his subjects." Compare verse 5.
(2) Which of the two generals has the greater ability? (3) With which side lie the advantages of Heaven and Earth?
Commentary: See verses 7 and 8.
(4) On which side is discipline more rigorously enforced?
Commentary: Tu Mu recalls the remarkable story of Ts'ao Ts'ao (A.D. 155–220), who was such a strict disciplinarian that once, under his own severe rules against damaging standing crops, he condemned himself to death for letting his horse shy into a field of corn. Instead of losing his head, however, he was persuaded to satisfy his sense of justice by cutting off his hair. Ts'ao Ts'ao's own comment on this passage is characteristically curt: "When you lay down a law, see that it is not disobeyed; if it is disobeyed, the offender must be put to death."
(5) Which army is the stronger?
Commentary: Morally as well as physically. As Mei Yao-ch'en puts it, freely rendered: esprit de corps and "big battalions".
(6) On which side are the officers and men better trained?
Commentary: Tu Yu quotes Wang Tzu: "Without constant practice, the officers will be nervous and undecided when the army musters for battle; without constant practice, the general will waver and hesitate when the crisis comes."
(7) In which army is there the greater consistency in both reward and punishment?
Commentary: On which side is it more certain that merit will be properly rewarded and misconduct summarily punished?
14. By means of these seven considerations I can forecast victory or defeat.
15. The general who listens to my advice and acts on it will win — keep such a one in command. The general who does not listen to my advice and does not act on it will be defeated — dismiss him.
Commentary: The form of this paragraph reminds us that Sun Tzu's treatise was written expressly for his patron Ho Lu, king of the Wu State.
16. While you are attending to the advantage of my advice, take advantage also of any helpful circumstances beyond the ordinary rules.
17. Modify your plans according as circumstances are favourable.
Commentary: Sun Tzu, a practical soldier, will have none of "bookish theory". He warns us here not to pin our faith on abstract principles; for, as Chang Yu puts it, "while the main laws of strategy can be stated clearly enough for anybody's benefit, in actual warfare you must be guided by the enemy's actions in trying to secure a favourable position." On the eve of Waterloo, Lord Uxbridge, commanding the cavalry, went to the Duke of Wellington to learn what his plans and calculations were for the next day, because, as he explained, he might suddenly find himself commander-in-chief and would be unable to frame new plans at a critical moment. The Duke listened quietly and then said: "Who will attack first tomorrow — I or Bonaparte?" "Bonaparte," replied Lord Uxbridge. "Well," said the Duke, "Bonaparte has given me no idea of his plans; and since mine will depend on his, how can you expect me to tell you what mine are?"
Footnote: "Words on Wellington," by Sir W. Fraser.
18. All warfare is based on deception.
Commentary: Every soldier will admit the truth of this pithy and profound saying. Colonel Henderson tells us that Wellington, great in so many military qualities, was especially distinguished by "the extraordinary skill with which he concealed his movements and deceived both friend and foe".
19. So when we are able to attack, we must seem unable; when we are using our forces, we must seem inactive; when we are near, we must make the enemy believe we are far away; when far away, we must make him believe we are near.
20. Hold out baits to entice the enemy. Feign disorder, and crush him.
Commentary: All the commentators except Chang Yu read this as "When he is in disorder, crush him." It is more natural to suppose that Sun Tzu is still illustrating the uses of deception in war.
21. If he is secure at every point, be prepared for him. If he is in superior strength, evade him.
22. If your opponent has a hot temper, try to irritate him. Pretend to be weak, so that he grows arrogant.
Commentary: Wang Tzu, quoted by Tu Yu, says that the good tactician plays with his adversary as a cat plays with a mouse — first feigning weakness and immobility, then suddenly pouncing.
23. If he is taking his ease, give him no rest.
Commentary: This is probably the meaning, though Mei Yao-ch'en has the note: "While we are taking our ease, wait for the enemy to tire himself out." The Yu Lan has "Lure him on and tire him out."
If his forces are united, separate them.
Commentary: Less plausible is the interpretation most of the commentators prefer: "If sovereign and subject are in accord, put division between them."
24. Attack him where he is unprepared; appear where you are not expected.
25. These military devices, which lead to victory, must not be disclosed beforehand.
26. Now the general who wins a battle makes many calculations in his temple before the battle is fought.
Commentary: Chang Yu tells us that in ancient times it was customary to set aside a temple for the use of a general who was about to take the field, so that he could work out his plan of campaign there.
The general who loses a battle makes few calculations beforehand. So many calculations lead to victory and few calculations to defeat — and how much worse is no calculation at all! It is by attending to this point that I can foresee who is likely to win and who to lose.
Commentary: Ts'ao Kung notes: "He who wishes to fight must first count the cost" — which prepares us for the discovery that the subject of this chapter is not what the title suggests, but is chiefly a consideration of ways and means.
1. Sun Tzu said: In war, where you have in the field a thousand swift chariots, as many heavy chariots, and a hundred thousand soldiers in armour,
Commentary: The "swift chariots" were lightly built and, according to Chang Yu, used for attack; the "heavy chariots" were heavier and designed for defence. Li Ch'uan does say the heavy ones were light, but this seems unlikely. The parallels between early Chinese warfare and that of the Homeric Greeks are interesting. In each case the war chariot was the important factor, forming the nucleus around which a certain number of foot soldiers were grouped. As for the numbers given here, we are told that each swift chariot was accompanied by 75 footmen and each heavy chariot by 25, so that the whole army would be divided into a thousand battalions, each of two chariots and a hundred men.
with provisions enough to carry them a thousand li,
Commentary: There are 2.78 modern li to a mile. The length may have varied slightly since Sun Tzu's time.
then the spending at home and at the front, including the entertainment of guests, small items like glue and paint, and the sums laid out on chariots and armour, will come to a thousand ounces of silver a day. That is the cost of raising an army of 100,000 men.
2. When you are actually fighting, if victory is slow in coming the men's weapons will grow dull and their enthusiasm will be damped. If you lay siege to a town, you will exhaust your strength.
3. And if the campaign drags on, the resources of the State will not be equal to the strain.
4. Now, when your weapons are dull, your enthusiasm damped, your strength exhausted and your treasure spent, other rulers will spring up to take advantage of your difficulties. Then no man, however wise, will be able to avert what follows.
5. So although we have heard of stupid haste in war, cleverness has never been seen in company with long delays.
Commentary: None of the commentators explains this concise and difficult sentence well. Ts'ao Kung, Li Ch'uan, Meng Shih, Tu Yu, Tu Mu and Mei Yao-ch'en all have notes to the effect that a general, though naturally stupid, may still win by sheer speed. Ho Shih says: "Haste may be stupid, but at least it saves the expenditure of energy and treasure; drawn-out operations may be very clever, but they bring calamity with them." Wang Hsi dodges the difficulty by remarking: "Long operations mean an army growing old, wealth being spent, an empty treasury and distress among the people; true cleverness insures against such calamities." Chang Yu says: "So long as victory can be had, stupid haste is preferable to clever dawdling." But Sun Tzu says nothing at all, except perhaps by implication, about ill-considered haste being better than ingenious but lengthy operations. What he does say is much more guarded: that while speed may sometimes be unwise, slowness can never be anything but foolish, if only because it impoverishes the nation. The classic example of Fabius the Delayer will inevitably come to mind here. He deliberately measured the endurance of Rome against that of Hannibal's isolated army, because it seemed to him that Hannibal was the likelier to suffer from a long campaign in a strange country. But whether his tactics would have succeeded in the long run is quite an open question. Reversing them led to Cannae, it is true; but that only makes a negative case in their favour.
6. There is no instance of a country having benefited from prolonged warfare.
7. Only the man thoroughly acquainted with the evils of war can thoroughly understand the profitable way of carrying it on.
Commentary: That is, with speed. Only a man who knows the disastrous effects of a long war can grasp how supremely important it is to bring one to a quick close. Only two commentators seem to favour this reading, but it fits the logic of the passage, whereas the alternative — "He who does not know the evils of war cannot appreciate its benefits" — is quite pointless.
8. The skilful soldier does not raise a second levy, and his supply wagons are not loaded more than twice.
Commentary: Once war is declared he will not waste precious time waiting for reinforcements, nor march his army back for fresh supplies; he crosses the enemy's frontier without delay. This may look like an audacious policy to recommend, but for every great strategist from Julius Caesar to Napoleon the value of time — that is, of being a little ahead of your opponent — has counted for more than either numerical superiority or the nicest calculations about supply.
9. Bring war material with you from home, but forage on the enemy. Then the army will have food enough for its needs.
Commentary: The Chinese word translated here as "war material" literally means "things to be used", and is meant in the widest sense. It covers all the baggage of an army apart from provisions.
10. Poverty in the State treasury forces an army to be maintained by contributions from a distance. Contributing to maintain an army at a distance impoverishes the people.
Commentary: The beginning of this sentence does not balance properly with what follows, though it is obviously meant to. The arrangement is so awkward, moreover, that I cannot help suspecting the text is corrupt. It never seems to occur to Chinese commentators that an emendation may be needed to make sense, and we get no help from them here. The words Sun Tzu used to indicate the cause of the people's impoverishment clearly refer to some system by which the farmers sent their contributions of corn directly to the army. But why should it fall to them to maintain an army that way, unless because the State is too poor to do it?
11. On the other hand, the nearness of an army makes prices go up, and high prices drain away the people's substance.
Commentary: Wang Hsi says the high prices occur before the army has left its own territory. Ts'ao Kung understands it of an army that has already crossed the frontier.
12. When their substance is drained away, the peasantry will be afflicted with heavy taxes.
13, 14. With their substance gone and their strength exhausted, the people's homes will be stripped bare and three-tenths of their income will be gone;
Commentary: Tu Mu and Wang Hsi agree that the people are mulcted not of 3/10 but of 7/10 of their income. But that can hardly be got out of our text. Ho Shih has a characteristic tag: "The people being regarded as the essential part of the State, and food as the people's heaven, is it not right that those in authority should value and take care of both?"
while government spending on broken chariots, worn-out horses, breastplates and helmets, bows and arrows, spears and shields, protective screens, draught oxen and heavy wagons will come to four-tenths of its total revenue.
15. So a wise general makes a point of foraging on the enemy. One cartload of the enemy's provisions is worth twenty of your own, and a single picul of his fodder is worth twenty from your own store.
Commentary: Because twenty cartloads will be consumed in getting one cartload to the front. A picul is a measure equal to 133.3 pounds (65.5 kilograms).
16. Now, to kill the enemy our men must be roused to anger; and for there to be any advantage in defeating him, they must have their rewards.
Commentary: Tu Mu says: "Rewards are necessary to make the soldiers see the advantage of beating the enemy; so when you capture spoils from him they must be used as rewards, so that all your men will have a keen desire to fight, each on his own account."
17. Therefore in chariot fighting, when ten or more chariots have been taken, reward the men who took the first. Substitute our own flags for the enemy's, and mix the captured chariots in with ours and use them. Treat the captured soldiers well, and keep them.
18. This is called using the conquered enemy to increase your own strength.
19. In war, then, let your great object be victory, not long campaigns.
Commentary: As Ho Shih remarks, "War is not a thing to be trifled with." Sun Tzu is restating here the main lesson this chapter exists to enforce.
20. So we may know that the leader of armies holds the people's fate in his hands: he is the man on whom it depends whether the nation shall be at peace or in peril.
1. Sun Tzu said: In the practical art of war, the best thing of all is to take the enemy's country whole and intact; shattering and destroying it is not so good. In the same way it is better to capture an army entire than to destroy it — better to capture a regiment, a detachment or a company entire than to destroy them.
Commentary: According to the Ssu-ma Fa, the equivalent of an army corps nominally consisted of 12,500 men. According to Ts'ao Kung, the equivalent of a regiment held 500 men, a detachment anything between 100 and 500, and a company between 5 and 100. For the last two, however, Chang Yu gives the exact figures of 100 and 5.
2. So to fight and win all your battles is not supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting.
Commentary: Here again, there is no modern strategist who will not approve the old Chinese general's words. Moltke's greatest triumph, the surrender of the huge French army at Sedan, was won practically without bloodshed.
3. The highest form of generalship, then, is to baulk the enemy's plans;
Commentary: The word "baulk" perhaps falls short of the full force of the Chinese, which implies not a defensive attitude — being content to foil the enemy's stratagems one after another — but an active policy of counter-attack. Ho Shih puts it very clearly: "When the enemy has made a plan of attack against us, we must anticipate him by delivering our own attack first."
the next best is to prevent the enemy's forces from joining up;
Commentary: Isolating him from his allies. We must not forget that when Sun Tzu speaks of hostilities he always has in mind the many states and principalities into which the China of his day was divided.
next after that is to attack the enemy's army in the field;
Commentary: When he is already at full strength.
and the worst policy of all is to besiege walled cities.
4. The rule is: do not besiege walled cities if it can possibly be avoided.
Commentary: Another sound piece of military theory. If the Boers had acted on it in 1899 and not frittered their strength away before Kimberley, Mafeking and even Ladysmith, they would very likely have been masters of the situation before the British were ready to oppose them seriously.
The preparation of mantlets, movable shelters and the various other implements of war will take three whole months;
Commentary: It is not entirely clear what the Chinese word translated here as "mantlets" described. Ts'ao Kung simply defines them as "large shields", but we get a better idea from Li Ch'uan, who says they were meant to protect the heads of men assaulting the city walls at close quarters. That suggests a sort of ready-made Roman testudo. Tu Mu says they were wheeled vehicles used to repel attacks, which Ch'en Hao denies. See above, Chapter Two, verse 14. The name is also applied to turrets on city walls. Of the "movable shelters" several commentators give a fairly clear description: wooden missile-proof structures on four wheels, propelled from inside, covered over with raw hides, and used in sieges to carry parties of men to and from the walls in order to fill in the encircling moat with earth. Tu Mu adds that they are now called "wooden donkeys".
and the piling up of mounds against the walls will take three months more.
Commentary: These were great mounds or ramparts of earth heaped up to the level of the enemy's walls, in order to find the weak points in the defence and also to destroy the fortified turrets mentioned in the previous note.
5. The general, unable to control his irritation, will launch his men to the assault like swarming ants,
Commentary: This vivid simile of Ts'ao Kung's comes from the spectacle of an army of ants climbing a wall. The meaning is that the general, losing patience at the long delay, may make a premature attempt to storm the place before his siege engines are ready.
with the result that one-third of his men are killed and the town still stands. Such are the disastrous effects of a siege.
Commentary: We are reminded of the terrible Japanese losses before Port Arthur, in the most recent siege history has to record.
6. So the skilful leader subdues the enemy's troops without any fighting; he captures their cities without laying siege to them; he overthrows their kingdom without long operations in the field.
Commentary: Chia Lin notes that he overthrows only the government and does no harm to individuals. The classic instance is Wu Wang, who, having put an end to the Yin dynasty, was hailed as "Father and mother of the people".
7. With his forces intact he will dispute the mastery of the Empire, and so his triumph will be complete without the loss of a single man.
Commentary: Because of the double meanings in the Chinese, the second half of the sentence will bear quite a different reading: "And so, the weapon not being blunted by use, its keenness remains perfect."
This is the method of attacking by stratagem.
8. It is the rule in war that if our forces are ten to the enemy's one, we surround him; if five to one, we attack him;
Commentary: Straight away, without waiting for any further advantage.
if twice as numerous, we divide our army in two.
Commentary: Tu Mu objects to this, and at first sight it does look as though it violated a fundamental principle of war. Ts'ao Kung, however, gives a clue to Sun Tzu's meaning: "Being two to the enemy's one, we may use one part of our army in the regular way and the other for some special diversion." Chang Yu explains further: "If our force is twice as numerous as the enemy's, it should be split into two divisions, one to meet him in front and one to fall on his rear; if he answers the frontal attack, he may be crushed from behind; if he answers the attack in his rear, he may be crushed in front." That is what is meant by saying that one part may be used in the regular way and the other for some special diversion. Tu Mu does not understand that dividing your army is simply the irregular method, just as concentrating it is the regular one, and he is too quick to call this a mistake.
9. If we are equally matched, we can offer battle;
Commentary: Li Ch'uan, followed by Ho Shih, paraphrases: "If attackers and attacked are equally matched in strength, only the able general will fight."
if we are slightly fewer, we can avoid the enemy;
Commentary: The reading "we can watch the enemy" is certainly a great improvement on this, but unfortunately there seems to be no good authority for the variant. Chang Yu reminds us that the saying only holds if the other factors are equal; a small difference in numbers is often more than made up for by superior energy and discipline.
if we are quite unequal in every way, we can run from him.
10. So although a small force may put up a stubborn fight, in the end it must be captured by the larger one.
11. Now the general is the bulwark of the State. If the bulwark is complete at every point, the State will be strong; if it is defective, the State will be weak.
Commentary: As Li Ch'uan tersely puts it: "A gap means a deficiency; if the general's ability is not perfect — that is, if he is not thoroughly master of his profession — his army will lack strength."
12. There are three ways in which a ruler can bring disaster on his own army:
13. (1) By ordering the army to advance or retreat when he does not know that it is unable to obey. This is called hobbling the army.
Commentary: Li Ch'uan comments: "It is like tying a thoroughbred's legs together so that it cannot gallop." One would naturally take "the ruler" in this passage to be at home, trying to direct his army's movements from a distance. But the commentators understand the reverse, and quote T'ai Kung's saying: "A kingdom should not be governed from outside it, and an army should not be directed from inside it." It is true, of course, that during an engagement, or when in close contact with the enemy, the general should not be in the thick of his own troops but a little apart. Otherwise he will misjudge the position as a whole and give the wrong orders.
14. (2) By trying to govern an army as he administers a kingdom, in ignorance of the conditions that hold in an army. This makes the soldiers restless.
Commentary: Ts'ao Kung's note, freely translated: "The military sphere and the civil sphere are wholly distinct; you cannot handle an army in kid gloves." And Chang Yu says: "Humanity and justice are the principles for governing a state, but not an army; opportunism and flexibility are military rather than civil virtues" — the point being that the governing of an army must not be assimilated to that of a State.
15. (3) By employing his officers indiscriminately,
Commentary: That is, he is not careful to put the right man in the right place.
in ignorance of the military principle of adapting to circumstances. This shakes the soldiers' confidence.
Commentary: I follow Mei Yao-ch'en here. The other commentators take this to refer not to the ruler, as in verses 13 and 14, but to the officers he employs. So Tu Yu says: "If a general is ignorant of the principle of adaptability, he must not be entrusted with a position of authority." Tu Mu quotes: "The skilful employer of men will employ the wise man, the brave man, the greedy man and the stupid man. For the wise man delights in establishing his merit, the brave man likes to show his courage in action, the greedy man is quick at seizing advantages, and the stupid man has no fear of death."
16. But when the army is restless and distrustful, trouble is certain to come from the other feudal princes. This is simply bringing anarchy into the army and throwing victory away.
17. So we may know that there are five essentials for victory. (1) He will win who knows when to fight and when not to fight.
Commentary: Chang Yu says: If he can fight, he advances and takes the offensive; if he cannot, he retreats and stands on the defensive. The man who knows whether it is right to take the offensive or the defensive will always win.
(2) He will win who knows how to handle both superior and inferior forces.
Commentary: This is not merely the general's ability to estimate numbers correctly, as Li Ch'uan and others make out. Chang Yu explains the saying more satisfactorily: "By applying the art of war it is possible for a smaller force to defeat a greater, and vice versa. The secret lies in an eye for ground, and in not letting the right moment slip. So Wu Tzu says: 'With a superior force, make for easy ground; with an inferior one, make for difficult ground.'"
(3) He will win whose army is animated by the same spirit through all its ranks.
(4) He will win who, being himself prepared, waits to take the enemy unprepared.
(5) He will win who has military ability and is not interfered with by his sovereign.
Commentary: Tu Yu quotes Wang Tzu: "It is the sovereign's function to give broad instructions, but the general's function to decide on battle." There is no need to dwell on the military disasters caused by undue interference from home governments with operations in the field. Napoleon undoubtedly owed much of his extraordinary success to not being hampered by any central authority.
Victory lies in knowing these five points.
Commentary: Literally, "These five things are knowledge of the principle of victory."
18. Hence the saying: If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory you gain you will also suffer a defeat.
Commentary: Li Ch'uan cites the case of Fu Chien, prince of Ch'in, who in A.D. 383 marched with a vast army against the Chin Emperor. Warned not to despise an enemy who could command the services of men like Hsieh An and Huan Ch'ung, he boasted: "I have the population of eight provinces behind me, infantry and horsemen to the number of a million; they could dam the Yangtse itself simply by throwing their whips into it. What have I to fear?" Soon afterwards his forces were disastrously routed at the Fei River, and he had to beat a hasty retreat.
If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will lose every battle.
Commentary: Chang Yu said: "Knowing the enemy lets you take the offensive; knowing yourself lets you stand on the defensive." And he adds: "Attack is the secret of defence; defence is the planning of an attack." It would be hard to find a better summary of the root principle of war.
Commentary: Ts'ao Kung explains what the Chinese words of this chapter's title mean: "marching and countermarching on the part of the two armies with a view to discovering each other's condition." Tu Mu says: "It is through the dispositions of an army that its condition can be discovered. Conceal your dispositions and your condition stays secret, which leads to victory; show them and your condition becomes obvious, which leads to defeat." Wang Hsi remarks that a good general can "secure success by modifying his tactics to meet the enemy's".
1. Sun Tzu said: The good fighters of old first put themselves beyond the possibility of defeat, and then waited for a chance to defeat the enemy.
2. Securing ourselves against defeat is in our own hands, but the chance to defeat the enemy is provided by the enemy himself.
Commentary: That is, by a mistake on his part.
3. So the good fighter can secure himself against defeat,
Commentary: Chang Yu says this is done "by concealing the disposition of his troops, covering up his tracks, and taking unremitting precautions".
but he cannot make certain of defeating the enemy.
4. Hence the saying: One may know how to conquer without being able to do it.
5. Security against defeat means defensive tactics; the ability to defeat the enemy means taking the offensive.
Commentary: I keep the sense found in the similar passage in verses 1 to 3, even though the commentators are all against me. The meaning they give — "He who cannot conquer takes the defensive" — is plausible enough.
6. Standing on the defensive indicates insufficient strength; attacking indicates a superabundance of it.
7. The general skilled in defence hides in the most secret recesses of the earth;
Commentary: Literally, "hides under the ninth earth" — a metaphor for the utmost secrecy and concealment, so that the enemy cannot know where he is.
the general skilled in attack flashes out from the topmost heights of heaven.
Commentary: Another metaphor, implying that he falls on his adversary like a thunderbolt, against which there is no time to prepare. This is the view of most of the commentators.
So on the one hand we have the ability to protect ourselves; on the other, a victory that is complete.
8. To see victory only when it is plain to the common crowd is not the height of excellence.
Commentary: As Ts'ao Kung remarks, "the thing is to see the plant before it has germinated" — to foresee the event before the action has begun. Li Ch'uan alludes to the story of Han Hsin, who, about to attack the vastly superior army of Chao strongly entrenched in the city of Ch'eng-an, said to his officers: "Gentlemen, we are going to annihilate the enemy, and shall meet again at dinner." The officers hardly took him seriously and gave a very doubtful assent. But Han Hsin had already worked out in his head the details of a clever stratagem by which, as he foresaw, he was able to take the city and inflict a crushing defeat on his adversary.
9. Nor is it the height of excellence if you fight and conquer and the whole Empire says, "Well done!"
Commentary: True excellence being, as Tu Mu says, "to plan secretly, to move stealthily, to foil the enemy's intentions and baulk his schemes, so that at last the day is won without shedding a drop of blood." Sun Tzu reserves his approval for things that
Commentary: "the world's coarse thumb / And finger fail to plumb."
10. To lift an autumn hair is no sign of great strength;
Commentary: "Autumn hair" is explained as the fur of a hare, which is finest in autumn when it begins to grow afresh. The phrase is very common in Chinese writers.
to see sun and moon is no sign of sharp sight; to hear the noise of thunder is no sign of a quick ear.
Commentary: Ho Shih gives real instances of strength, sharp sight and quick hearing: Wu Huo, who could lift a tripod weighing 250 stone; Li Chu, who at a hundred paces could see objects no bigger than a mustard seed; and Shih K'uang, a blind musician who could hear a mosquito's footsteps.
11. What the ancients called a clever fighter is one who not only wins, but excels at winning easily.
Commentary: The last half is literally "one who, conquering, excels in easy conquering". Mei Yao-ch'en says: "He who sees only the obvious wins his battles with difficulty; he who looks below the surface of things wins with ease."
12. So his victories bring him neither a reputation for wisdom nor credit for courage.
Commentary: Tu Mu explains this very well: "Since his victories are gained over circumstances that have not come to light, the world at large knows nothing of them, and he wins no reputation for wisdom; since the hostile state submits before any blood has been shed, he receives no credit for courage."
13. He wins his battles by making no mistakes.
Commentary: Ch'en Hao says: "He plans no superfluous marches, he devises no futile attacks." Chang Yu explains the connection of ideas: "One who seeks to conquer by sheer strength, however clever he may be at winning pitched battles, is also liable to be beaten on occasion; whereas the man who can look into the future and discern conditions that are not yet visible will never blunder, and therefore always wins."
Making no mistakes is what establishes the certainty of victory, for it means conquering an enemy who is already defeated.
14. So the skilful fighter puts himself in a position that makes defeat impossible, and does not miss the moment for defeating the enemy.
Commentary: A "counsel of perfection", as Tu Mu truly observes. "Position" need not be confined to the actual ground the troops occupy. It includes all the arrangements and preparations a wise general will make to increase his army's safety.
15. So it is that in war the victorious strategist seeks battle only after the victory has been won, whereas the man destined to defeat fights first and looks for victory afterwards.
Commentary: Ho Shih explains the paradox: "In warfare, first lay plans that will ensure victory, and then lead your army to battle; if you will not begin with stratagem but rely on brute strength alone, victory is no longer assured."
16. The consummate leader cultivates the Moral Law and holds strictly to method and discipline; so it is in his power to control success.
17. In military method we have, first, Measurement; second, Estimation of quantity; third, Calculation; fourth, Balancing of chances; fifth, Victory.
18. Measurement owes its existence to Earth; Estimation of quantity to Measurement; Calculation to Estimation of quantity; Balancing of chances to Calculation; and Victory to Balancing of chances.
Commentary: It is not easy to distinguish the four terms very clearly in the Chinese. The first seems to be the surveying and measuring of the ground, which lets us form an estimate of the enemy's strength and make calculations from the data so obtained; we are then led to a general weighing-up, a comparison of the enemy's chances with our own; and if ours turn the scale, victory follows. The chief difficulty lies in the third term, which some commentators take as a calculation of numbers, making it nearly synonymous with the second. Perhaps the second should be thought of as a consideration of the enemy's general position or condition, while the third is the estimate of his numerical strength. On the other hand, Tu Mu says: "The question of relative strength having been settled, we can bring the varied resources of cunning into play." Ho Shih supports this reading, but weakens it. It does point, however, to the third term being a calculation of numbers.
19. A victorious army against a routed one is like a pound's weight in the scale against a single grain.
Commentary: Literally, "a victorious army is like an i (20 oz.) weighed against a shu (1/24 oz.); a routed army is a shu weighed against an i." The point is simply the enormous advantage a disciplined force flushed with victory has over one demoralized by defeat. Legge, in his note on Mencius, I. 2. ix. 2, makes the i 24 Chinese ounces and corrects Chu Hsi's statement that it equalled only 20. But Li Ch'uan of the T'ang dynasty gives the same figure here as Chu Hsi.
20. The onrush of a conquering force is like the bursting of pent-up waters into a chasm a thousand fathoms deep. So much for tactical dispositions.
1. Sun Tzu said: Controlling a large force works on the same principle as controlling a few men: it is merely a question of dividing up their numbers.
Commentary: That is, cutting the army up into regiments, companies and so on, with subordinate officers commanding each. Tu Mu reminds us of Han Hsin's famous reply to the first Han Emperor, who once asked him: "How large an army do you think I could lead?" "Not more than 100,000 men, your Majesty." "And you?" asked the Emperor. "Oh," he answered, "the more the better."
2. Fighting with a large army under your command is no different from fighting with a small one: it is merely a question of setting up signs and signals.
3. To make sure that your whole host can take the brunt of the enemy's attack and stay unshaken — this is done by manoeuvres direct and indirect.
Commentary: We now come to one of the most interesting parts of Sun Tzu's treatise, the discussion of cheng and ch'i. Since it is by no means easy to grasp the full force of these two terms, or to translate them consistently with good English equivalents, it may be as well to set out some of the commentators' remarks before going further. Li Ch'uan: "Facing the enemy is cheng; making a lateral diversion is ch'i." Chia Lin: "In the enemy's presence your troops should be drawn up in the normal way, but to secure victory abnormal manoeuvres must be used." Mei Yao-ch'en: "Ch'i is active, cheng is passive; passivity means waiting for an opportunity, activity brings the victory itself." Ho Shih: "We must make the enemy see our straightforward attack as one secretly designed, and the other way about; so cheng may also be ch'i, and ch'i may also be cheng." He instances the famous exploit of Han Hsin, who, while marching ostensibly against Lin-chin (now Chao-i in Shensi), suddenly threw a large force across the Yellow River in wooden tubs and utterly disconcerted his opponent. [Ch'ien Han Shu, ch. 3.] Here, we are told, the march on Lin-chin was cheng and the surprise manoeuvre was ch'i. Chang Yu summarises the opinions on the words: "Military writers do not agree about the meaning of ch'i and cheng. Wei Liao Tzu (4th century B.C.) says: 'Direct warfare favours frontal attacks, indirect warfare attacks from the rear.' Ts'ao Kung says: 'Going straight out to join battle is a direct operation; appearing in the enemy's rear is an indirect manoeuvre.' Li Wei-kung (6th and 7th centuries A.D.) says: 'In war, marching straight ahead is cheng; turning movements are ch'i.' These writers simply take cheng as cheng and ch'i as ch'i; they do not notice that the two are interchangeable and run into each other like the two sides of a circle (see below, verse 11). A comment of the T'ang Emperor T'ai Tsung goes to the root of the matter: 'A ch'i manoeuvre may be cheng, if we make the enemy see it as cheng; then our real attack will be ch'i, and the other way about. The whole secret lies in confusing the enemy, so that he cannot fathom our real intention.'" To put it perhaps a little more clearly: any attack or other operation on which the enemy has had his attention fixed is cheng, while what takes him by surprise or comes from an unexpected quarter is ch'i. If the enemy notices a movement that was meant to be ch'i, it immediately becomes cheng.
4. To make the impact of your army like a grindstone dashed against an egg — this is done by the science of weak points and strong.
5. In all fighting, the direct method may be used to join battle, but indirect methods will be needed to secure victory.
Commentary: Chang Yu says: "Steadily develop indirect tactics, either by pounding the enemy's flanks or falling on his rear." A brilliant example of "indirect tactics" that decided the fortunes of a campaign was Lord Roberts's night march round the Peiwar Kotal in the second Afghan war.
Footnote: "Forty-one Years in India," chapter 46.
6. Indirect tactics, efficiently applied, are as inexhaustible as Heaven and Earth, as unending as the flow of rivers and streams; like the sun and moon, they end only to begin again; like the four seasons, they pass away only to return.
Commentary: Tu Yu and Chang Yu understand this of the permutations of ch'i and cheng. But Sun Tzu is not speaking of cheng at all here, unless we suppose with Cheng Yu-hsien that a clause about it has dropped out of the text. Of course, as has been pointed out already, the two are so inextricably interwoven in all military operations that they cannot really be considered apart. What we have here is simply an expression, in figurative language, of a great leader's almost infinite resource.
7. There are no more than five musical notes, yet their combinations give rise to more melodies than can ever be heard.
8. There are no more than five primary colours (blue, yellow, red, white and black), yet in combination they produce more hues than can ever be seen.
9. There are no more than five cardinal tastes (sour, acrid, salt, sweet, bitter), yet their combinations yield more flavours than can ever be tasted.
10. In battle there are no more than two methods of attack, the direct and the indirect; yet the two in combination give rise to an endless series of manoeuvres.
11. The direct and the indirect lead on to each other in turn. It is like moving in a circle: you never come to an end. Who can exhaust the possibilities of their combination?
12. The onset of troops is like the rush of a torrent that will roll even stones along in its course.
13. The quality of decision is like the well-timed swoop of a falcon, which lets it strike and destroy its victim.
Commentary: The Chinese here is tricky, and one key word in this context defies the translator's best efforts. Tu Mu defines it as "the measurement or estimation of distance". But that does not quite fit the illustrative simile in verse 15. Applied to the falcon, it seems to me to denote the instinct of self-restraint that keeps the bird from swooping on its quarry until the right moment, together with the power of judging when that moment has come. The corresponding quality in soldiers is the highly important one of being able to hold their fire until the very instant when it will be most effective. When the "Victory" went into action at Trafalgar at hardly more than drifting pace, she was exposed for several minutes to a storm of shot and shell before replying with a single gun. Nelson coolly waited until he was at close range, and then the broadside he brought to bear worked fearful havoc on the enemy's nearest ships.
14. So the good fighter will be terrible in his onset and prompt in his decision.
Commentary: The word "decision" would refer to the measurement of distance mentioned above — letting the enemy get near before striking. But I cannot help thinking that Sun Tzu meant it in a figurative sense, comparable to our own idiom "short and sharp". Compare Wang Hsi's note, which, after describing the falcon's method of attack, goes on: "This is just how the 'psychological moment' should be seized in war."
15. Energy may be compared to the bending of a crossbow; decision, to the releasing of the trigger.
Commentary: None of the commentators seems to grasp the real point of the simile: the force stored up in the bent crossbow until the finger on the trigger releases it.
16. Amid the turmoil and tumult of battle there may be seeming disorder and yet no real disorder at all; amid confusion and chaos your array may be without head or tail, yet it will be proof against defeat.
Commentary: Mei Yao-ch'en says: "The subdivisions of the army having been fixed beforehand, and the various signals agreed on, the separating and joining, the dispersing and collecting that take place in the course of a battle may give the appearance of disorder when no real disorder is possible. Your formation may be without head or tail, your dispositions all topsy-turvy, and yet a rout of your forces quite out of the question."
17. Simulated disorder presupposes perfect discipline; simulated fear presupposes courage; simulated weakness presupposes strength.
Commentary: To make the translation intelligible it is necessary to tone down the sharply paradoxical form of the original. Ts'ao Kung hints at the meaning in his brief note: "These things all serve to break up formation and conceal one's condition." But Tu Mu is the first to put it plainly: "If you wish to feign confusion in order to lure the enemy on, you must first have perfect discipline; if you wish to display timidity in order to trap him, you must have extreme courage; if you wish to parade your weakness in order to make him overconfident, you must have exceeding strength."
18. Hiding order beneath a cloak of disorder is simply a question of subdivision;
Commentary: See above, verse 1.
concealing courage under a show of timidity presupposes a fund of latent energy;
Commentary: The commentators strongly understand a certain Chinese word here in a different sense from anywhere else in the chapter. So Tu Mu says: "Seeing that we are favourably placed and yet make no move, the enemy will believe we are really afraid."
masking strength with weakness is a matter of tactical dispositions.
Commentary: Chang Yu tells this anecdote of Kao Tsu, the first Han Emperor. Wishing to crush the Hsiung-nu, he sent out spies to report on their condition. But the Hsiung-nu, forewarned, carefully hid all their able-bodied men and well-fed horses, and let nothing be seen but infirm soldiers and emaciated cattle. The result was that the spies recommended, one and all, that the Emperor should attack. Lou Ching alone opposed them: "When two countries go to war, they are naturally inclined to make an ostentatious display of their strength. Yet our spies have seen nothing but old age and infirmity. This is surely some ruse on the enemy's part, and it would be unwise for us to attack." The Emperor disregarded the advice, fell into the trap, and found himself surrounded at Po-teng.
19. So the man who is skilful at keeping the enemy on the move keeps up deceitful appearances, and the enemy acts on them.
Commentary: Ts'ao Kung's note is: "Make a display of weakness and want." Tu Mu says: "If our force happens to be superior to the enemy's, weakness may be simulated in order to lure him on; but if it is inferior, he must be led to believe we are strong, so that he keeps away. In fact all the enemy's movements should be determined by the signs we choose to give him." Note this anecdote of Sun Pin, a descendant of Sun Wu. In 341 B.C. the Ch'i State, being at war with Wei, sent T'ien Chi and Sun Pin against the general P'ang Chuan, who happened to be Sun Pin's deadly personal enemy. Sun Pin said: "The Ch'i State has a reputation for cowardice, and so our adversary despises us. Let us turn that to account." So when the army had crossed the border into Wei territory, he ordered 100,000 fires to be shown on the first night, 50,000 on the next, and only 20,000 the night after. P'ang Chuan pursued them hotly, saying to himself: "I knew these men of Ch'i were cowards: their numbers have already fallen by more than half." In his retreat Sun Pin came to a narrow defile which he calculated his pursuers would reach after dark. Here he had a tree stripped of its bark and these words written on it: "Under this tree shall P'ang Chuan die." Then, as night fell, he put a strong body of archers in ambush nearby with orders to shoot the moment they saw a light. Later P'ang Chuan arrived at the spot, noticed the tree, and struck a light to read what was written on it. His body was immediately riddled with arrows and his whole army thrown into confusion. (This is Tu Mu's version of the story; the Shih Chi, less dramatically but probably with more historical truth, has P'ang Chuan cut his own throat with an exclamation of despair after the rout of his army.)
He sacrifices something, so that the enemy may snatch at it.
20. By holding out baits he keeps him on the march; then, with a body of picked men, he lies in wait for him.
Commentary: With an emendation suggested by Li Ching this reads: "He lies in wait with the main body of his troops."
21. The clever fighter looks to the effect of combined energy, and does not ask too much of individuals.
Commentary: Tu Mu says: "He first considers the power of his army in the mass; afterwards he takes individual talent into account and uses each man according to his capabilities. He does not demand perfection from the untalented."
Hence his ability to pick out the right men and make use of combined energy.
22. When he makes use of combined energy, his fighting men become like rolling logs or stones. For it is the nature of a log or a stone to stay motionless on level ground and to move on a slope; if four-cornered, to come to a stop, but if round, to go rolling down.
Commentary: Ts'ao Kung calls this "the use of natural or inherent power".
23. So the energy developed by good fighting men is like the momentum of a round stone rolled down a mountain thousands of feet high. So much for the subject of energy.
Commentary: The chief lesson of this chapter, in Tu Mu's opinion, is the paramount importance in war of rapid movement and sudden rushes. "Great results," he adds, "can be achieved this way with small forces."
Commentary: Chang Yu tries to explain the sequence of the chapters: "Chapter Four, on Tactical Dispositions, dealt with the offensive and the defensive; Chapter Five, on Energy, with direct and indirect methods. The good general first acquaints himself with the theory of attack and defence, then turns to direct and indirect methods. He studies the art of varying and combining these two before going on to weak and strong points. For the use of direct or indirect methods arises out of attack and defence, and the perception of weak and strong points depends in turn on those methods. That is why the present chapter comes immediately after the one on Energy."
1. Sun Tzu said: Whoever is first in the field and waits for the enemy to come will be fresh for the fight; whoever is second in the field and has to hurry to battle will arrive exhausted.
2. So the clever combatant imposes his will on the enemy, but does not let the enemy's will be imposed on him.
Commentary: One mark of a great soldier is that he fights on his own terms or does not fight at all.
Footnote: See Colonel Henderson's biography of Stonewall Jackson, 1902 edition, vol. II, p. 490.
3. By holding out advantages he can make the enemy come to him of his own accord; or, by inflicting damage, he can make it impossible for the enemy to come near.
Commentary: In the first case he will entice him with a bait; in the second he will strike at some important point that the enemy will have to defend.
4. If the enemy is taking his ease, he can harass him;
Commentary: This passage may be cited as evidence against Mei Yao-ch'en's reading of Chapter One, verse 23.
if he is well supplied with food, he can starve him out; if he is quietly encamped, he can force him to move.
5. Appear at points the enemy must hurry to defend; march swiftly to places where you are not expected.
6. An army may march great distances without distress if it marches through country where the enemy is not.
Commentary: Ts'ao Kung sums it up very well: "Emerge from the void" — that is, like a bolt from the blue — "strike at vulnerable points, shun places that are defended, attack in unexpected quarters."
7. You can be sure of succeeding in your attacks if you attack only places that are undefended.
Commentary: Wang Hsi explains "undefended places" as "weak points — that is, where the general lacks capacity or the soldiers lack spirit; where the walls are not strong enough or the precautions not strict enough; where relief comes too late, or provisions are too scanty, or the defenders are at odds among themselves."
You can ensure the safety of your defence if you hold only positions that cannot be attacked.
Commentary: That is, where there are none of the weak points mentioned above. There is a rather nice point in how to read this second clause. Tu Mu, Ch'en Hao and Mei Yao-ch'en take the meaning to be: "To make your defence quite safe you must defend even those places that are not likely to be attacked" — and Tu Mu adds: "How much more, then, those that will be." Taken that way, however, the clause balances less well with the one before it, which is always a consideration in the highly antithetical style natural to Chinese. Chang Yu therefore seems nearer the mark: "He who is skilled in attack flashes out from the topmost heights of heaven (see Chapter Four, verse 7), making it impossible for the enemy to guard against him. That being so, the places I shall attack are precisely those the enemy cannot defend… He who is skilled in defence hides in the most secret recesses of the earth, making it impossible for the enemy to guess where he is. That being so, the places I shall hold are precisely those the enemy cannot attack."
8. So the general is skilful in attack whose opponent does not know what to defend, and skilful in defence whose opponent does not know what to attack.
Commentary: An aphorism that puts the whole art of war in a nutshell.
9. O divine art of subtlety and secrecy! Through you we learn to be invisible, through you inaudible;
Commentary: Literally, "without form or sound" — with reference, of course, to the enemy.
and so we can hold the enemy's fate in our hands.
10. You may advance and be absolutely irresistible, if you make for the enemy's weak points; you may retire and be safe from pursuit, if your movements are quicker than his.
11. If we want to fight, the enemy can be forced into an engagement even though he is sheltered behind a high rampart and a deep ditch. All we need do is attack some other place he will be obliged to relieve.
Commentary: Tu Mu says: "If the enemy is the invader, we can cut his lines of communication and occupy the roads he will have to return by; if we are the invaders, we may direct our attack against the sovereign himself." Clearly Sun Tzu, unlike certain generals in the late Boer war, was no believer in frontal attacks.
12. If we do not want to fight, we can stop the enemy from engaging us even though the lines of our camp are merely traced on the ground. All we need do is throw something odd and unaccountable in his way.
Commentary: This extremely concise expression is intelligibly paraphrased by Chia Lin: "even though we have built neither wall nor ditch." Li Ch'uan says: "We puzzle him with strange and unusual dispositions." And Tu Mu clinches the meaning with three anecdotes, one of them about Chu-ko Liang, who, holding Yang-p'ing and about to be attacked by Ssu-ma I, suddenly struck his colours, stopped the drums and flung the city gates open, showing nothing but a few men sweeping and sprinkling the ground. This unexpected behaviour had the intended effect: Ssu-ma I, suspecting an ambush, actually drew off his army and retreated. What Sun Tzu is advocating here, then, is nothing more nor less than the timely use of bluff.
13. By discovering the enemy's dispositions while remaining invisible ourselves, we can keep our forces concentrated while his must be divided.
Commentary: The conclusion is perhaps not very obvious, but Chang Yu, following Mei Yao-ch'en, rightly explains: "If the enemy's dispositions are visible, we can make for him in one body; whereas our own dispositions being kept secret, the enemy will be obliged to divide his forces to guard against attack from every quarter."
14. We can form a single united body while the enemy must split into fractions. So there will be a whole pitted against separate parts of a whole, which means we shall be many to the enemy's few.
15. And if we can attack an inferior force with a superior one, our opponents will be in dire straits.
16. The spot where we intend to fight must not be made known, for then the enemy will have to prepare against a possible attack at several different points;
Commentary: Sheridan once explained General Grant's victories by saying that "while his opponents were kept fully employed wondering what he was going to do, he was thinking most about what he was going to do himself".
and his forces being spread in so many directions, the numbers we shall have to face at any one point will be proportionately few.
17. For if the enemy strengthens his front, he will weaken his rear; if he strengthens his rear, he will weaken his front; if he strengthens his left, he will weaken his right; if he strengthens his right, he will weaken his left. If he sends reinforcements everywhere, he will be weak everywhere.
Commentary: In Frederick the Great's Instructions to his Generals we read: "A defensive war is apt to betray us into too frequent detachment. Those generals who have had but little experience attempt to protect every point, while those who are better acquainted with their profession, having only the capital object in view, guard against a decisive blow, and acquiesce in small misfortunes to avoid greater."
18. Numerical weakness comes from having to prepare against possible attacks; numerical strength, from forcing our adversary to make those preparations against us.
Commentary: The highest generalship, in Colonel Henderson's words, is "to compel the enemy to disperse his army, and then to concentrate superior force against each fraction in turn".
19. Knowing the place and the time of the coming battle, we can concentrate from the greatest distances in order to fight.
Commentary: What Sun Tzu evidently has in mind is that nice calculation of distances, and that masterly use of strategy, which lets a general divide his army for a long, rapid march and then bring it together again at precisely the right spot and the right hour, to face the enemy in overwhelming strength. Of the many such successful junctions military history records, one of the most dramatic and decisive was Blücher's appearance at the critical moment on the field of Waterloo.
20. But if neither time nor place is known, then the left wing will be unable to help the right and the right unable to help the left; the front will not be able to relieve the rear, nor the rear to support the front. How much more so if the furthest parts of the army are anything under a hundred li apart, and even the nearest are separated by several li!
Commentary: The Chinese of this last sentence lacks a little in precision, but the picture we are meant to draw is probably of an army advancing towards a given rendezvous in separate columns, each ordered to be there on a fixed date. If the general lets the various detachments proceed at haphazard, with no precise instructions about the time and place of meeting, the enemy will be able to destroy the army piece by piece. Chang Yu's note is worth quoting here: "If we do not know the place where our opponents mean to concentrate, or the day on which they will give battle, our unity will be lost through our preparations for defence, and the positions we hold will be insecure. Coming suddenly upon a powerful enemy, we shall be brought to battle in a flurry, and no mutual support will be possible between wings, vanguard and rear — especially if there is any great distance between the foremost and hindmost divisions of the army."
21. Though by my estimate the soldiers of Yueh outnumber our own, that will do them no good in the matter of victory. I say, then, that victory can be achieved.
Commentary: Alas for these brave words. The long feud between the two states ended in 473 B.C. with the total defeat of Wu by Kou Chien and its absorption into Yueh. That was doubtless long after Sun Tzu's death. Compare this assertion with Chapter Four, verse 4. Chang Yu is the only commentator to point out the apparent discrepancy, and he explains it: "In the chapter on Tactical Dispositions it is said, 'One may know how to conquer without being able to do it,' whereas here we have the statement that victory can be achieved. The explanation is that in the earlier chapter, where the offensive and the defensive are under discussion, it is said that if the enemy is fully prepared one cannot be certain of beating him. But this passage refers particularly to the soldiers of Yueh who, by Sun Tzu's calculations, will be kept in ignorance of the time and place of the coming struggle. That is why he says here that victory can be achieved."
22. Though the enemy is stronger in numbers, we may prevent him from fighting. Scheme so as to discover his plans and how likely they are to succeed.
Commentary: An alternative reading offered by Chia Lin is: "Know beforehand all plans conducive to our success and to the enemy's failure."
23. Rouse him, and learn the principle of his activity or inactivity.
Commentary: Chang Yu tells us that by noting the joy or anger the enemy shows on being disturbed this way, we can judge whether his policy is to lie low or the reverse. He instances the action of Chu-ko Liang, who sent the scornful present of a woman's headdress to Ssu-ma I in order to goad him out of his delaying tactics.
Force him to reveal himself, so as to find out his vulnerable spots.
24. Compare the opposing army carefully with your own, so that you may know where strength is superabundant and where it is deficient.
Commentary: Compare Chapter Four, verse 6.
25. In making tactical dispositions, the highest pitch you can reach is to conceal them;
Commentary: The piquancy of the paradox evaporates in translation. Concealment here is perhaps not so much actual invisibility (see above, verse 9) as "showing no sign" of what you mean to do, of the plans formed in your head.
conceal your dispositions, and you will be safe from the prying of the subtlest spies and the machinations of the wisest brains.
Commentary: Tu Mu explains: "Though the enemy may have clever and capable officers, they will not be able to lay any plans against us."
26. How victory may be produced for them out of the enemy's own tactics — that is what the multitude cannot understand.
27. All men can see the tactics by which I conquer, but what none can see is the strategy out of which the victory grew.
Commentary: That is, anybody can see superficially how a battle is won; what they cannot see is the long series of plans and combinations that came before it.
28. Do not repeat the tactics that won you one victory; let your methods be governed by the infinite variety of circumstances.
Commentary: As Wang Hsi sagely remarks: "There is only one root principle underlying victory, but the tactics that lead up to it are infinite in number." Compare Colonel Henderson: "The rules of strategy are few and simple. They may be learned in a week. They may be taught by familiar illustrations or a dozen diagrams. But such knowledge will no more teach a man to lead an army like Napoleon than a knowledge of grammar will teach him to write like Gibbon."
29. Military tactics are like water; for water in its natural course runs away from high places and hurries downwards.
30. So in war the way is to avoid what is strong and strike at what is weak.
Commentary: Like water, taking the line of least resistance.
31. Water shapes its course according to the nature of the ground over which it flows; the soldier works out his victory in relation to the enemy he is facing.
32. So, just as water keeps no constant shape, in warfare there are no constant conditions.
33. He who can modify his tactics in relation to his opponent, and so win, may be called a heaven-born captain.
34. The five elements (water, fire, wood, metal, earth) are not always equally predominant;
Commentary: That is, as Wang Hsi says, "they predominate alternately".
the four seasons give way to each other in turn.
Commentary: Literally, "have no invariable seat".
There are short days and long; the moon has its waning and its waxing.
Commentary: Compare Chapter Five, verse 6. The point of the passage is simply to illustrate the lack of fixity in war by the changes constantly taking place in nature. The comparison is not a very happy one, though, because the regularity of the phenomena Sun Tzu mentions has no parallel in war at all.
1. Sun Tzu said: In war, the general receives his commands from the sovereign.
2. Having gathered an army and concentrated his forces, he must blend and harmonize its different elements before he pitches his camp.
Commentary: Chang Yu speaks of "the establishment of harmony and confidence between the higher and lower ranks before venturing into the field", and quotes a saying of Wu Tzu (chapter 1, at the beginning): "Without harmony in the State no military expedition can be undertaken; without harmony in the army no battle array can be formed." In a historical romance Sun Tzu is made to say to Wu Yuan: "As a general rule, those who are waging war should get rid of all their domestic troubles before going on to attack the enemy outside."
3. After that comes tactical manoeuvring, and there is nothing more difficult.
Commentary: I depart slightly from Ts'ao Kung's traditional reading, which is: "From the time of receiving the sovereign's instructions until we encamp facing the enemy, the tactics to be followed are most difficult." It seems to me that the tactics or manoeuvres can hardly be said to begin until the army has marched out and encamped, and Ch'ien Hao's note supports that view: "For levying, concentrating, harmonizing and entrenching an army there are plenty of old rules that will serve. The real difficulty comes when we begin tactical operations." Tu Yu also observes that "the great difficulty is to be ahead of the enemy in seizing a favourable position".
The difficulty of tactical manoeuvring lies in turning the devious into the direct, and misfortune into gain.
Commentary: This sentence contains one of those highly condensed and rather enigmatic expressions Sun Tzu is so fond of. Ts'ao Kung explains it: "Make it appear that you are a long way off, then cover the distance rapidly and arrive before your opponent." Tu Mu says: "Hoodwink the enemy, so that he is slack and unhurried while you are dashing along at top speed." Ho Shih gives it a slightly different turn: "Although you may have difficult ground to cross and natural obstacles to meet, this is a drawback that speed of movement can turn into a real advantage." Signal examples of the saying are the two famous crossings of the Alps — Hannibal's, which laid Italy at his mercy, and Napoleon's two thousand years later, which ended in the great victory of Marengo.
4. So, to take a long and circuitous route after enticing the enemy out of the way, and to start after him and still contrive to reach the goal first, shows knowledge of the artifice of deviation.
Commentary: Tu Mu cites the famous march of Chao She in 270 B.C. to relieve the town of O-yu, which was closely besieged by a Ch'in army. The King of Chao first consulted Lien P'o about whether relief was advisable, but he thought the distance too great and the intervening country too rugged. The King then turned to Chao She, who freely admitted how hazardous the march was, but finally said: "We shall be like two rats fighting in a hole — and the pluckier one will win." So he left the capital with his army, but had gone only 30 li when he stopped and began throwing up entrenchments. For 28 days he went on strengthening his fortifications, and took care that spies should carry the news to the enemy. The Ch'in general was overjoyed, and put his adversary's slowness down to the fact that the besieged city was in the Han State and so not actually part of Chao territory. But the spies had no sooner left than Chao She began a forced march lasting two days and one night, and arrived on the scene with such astonishing speed that he was able to occupy a commanding position on the North Hill before the enemy had got wind of his movements. A crushing defeat followed for the Ch'in forces, who had to raise the siege of O-yu in all haste and retreat across the border.
5. Manoeuvring with an army is advantageous; with an undisciplined multitude, most dangerous.
Commentary: I adopt the reading of the T'ung Tien, Cheng Yu-hsien and the T'u Shu, since they seem to supply the exact nuance needed to make sense. The commentators who use the standard text take the line to mean that manoeuvres may be profitable or they may be dangerous, according to the general's ability.
6. If you set a fully equipped army marching to snatch an advantage, the chances are you will be too late. On the other hand, sending out a flying column for the purpose means sacrificing its baggage and stores.
Commentary: Some of the Chinese here is unintelligible to the Chinese commentators, who paraphrase the sentence. I offer my own rendering without much enthusiasm, being convinced there is some deep-seated corruption in the text. On the whole it is clear that Sun Tzu does not approve of a long march undertaken without supplies. Compare below, verse 11.
7. So if you order your men to roll up their buff coats and make forced marches without halting day or night, covering twice the usual distance at a stretch,
Commentary: The ordinary day's march, according to Tu Mu, was 30 li; but on one occasion, pursuing Liu Pei, Ts'ao Ts'ao is said to have covered the incredible distance of 300 li in twenty-four hours.
doing a hundred li to wrest an advantage, the leaders of all three of your divisions will fall into the enemy's hands.
8. The stronger men will be in front, the tired ones will fall behind, and on this plan only one-tenth of your army will reach its destination.
Commentary: The moral, as Ts'ao Kung and others point out, is: do not march a hundred li to gain a tactical advantage, with or without baggage. Manoeuvres of this kind should be kept to short distances. Stonewall Jackson said: "The hardships of forced marches are often more painful than the dangers of battle." He did not often call on his troops for extraordinary exertions. It was only when he intended a surprise, or when a rapid retreat was imperative, that he sacrificed everything to speed.
Footnote: See Colonel Henderson, op. cit. vol. I, p. 426.
9. If you march fifty li to outmanoeuvre the enemy, you will lose the leader of your first division, and only half your force will reach the goal.
Commentary: Literally, "the leader of the first division will be torn away".
10. If you march thirty li with the same object, two-thirds of your army will arrive.
Commentary: The T'ung Tien adds: "From this we may know the difficulty of manoeuvring."
11. We may take it, then, that an army without its baggage train is lost; without provisions it is lost; without bases of supply it is lost.
Commentary: I think Sun Tzu meant "stores accumulated in depots". But Tu Yu says "fodder and the like", Chang Yu says "goods in general", and Wang Hsi says "fuel, salt, foodstuffs and so on".
12. We cannot enter into alliances until we know the designs of our neighbours.
13. We are not fit to lead an army on the march unless we are familiar with the face of the country — its mountains and forests, its pitfalls and precipices, its marshes and swamps.
14. We shall be unable to turn natural advantages to account unless we use local guides.
Commentary: Verses 12 to 14 are repeated in Chapter Eleven, verse 52.
15. In war, practise dissimulation, and you will succeed.
Commentary: In the tactics of Turenne, deceiving the enemy — especially about the numerical strength of his troops — held a very prominent place.
Footnote: For a number of maxims on this head, see "Marshal Turenne" (Longmans, 1907), p. 29.
Move only if there is a real advantage to be gained.
16. Whether to concentrate your troops or divide them must be decided by circumstances.
17. Let your speed be that of the wind,
Commentary: The simile is doubly apt, because the wind is not only swift but, as Mei Yao-ch'en points out, "invisible and leaves no tracks".
your compactness that of the forest.
Commentary: Meng Shih comes nearer the mark: "When marching slowly, order and ranks must be kept" — so as to guard against a surprise attack. Natural forests do not grow in rows, but they generally do have the quality of density or compactness.
18. In raiding and plundering be like fire,
Commentary: Compare the Shih Ching, IV. 3. iv. 6: "Fierce as a blazing fire which no man can check."
in immovability like a mountain.
Commentary: That is, when holding a position the enemy is trying to dislodge you from — or perhaps, as Tu Yu says, when he is trying to entice you into a trap.
19. Let your plans be dark and impenetrable as night, and when you move, fall like a thunderbolt.
Commentary: Tu Yu quotes a saying of T'ai Kung's that has become a proverb: "You cannot shut your ears to the thunder or your eyes to the lightning — so rapid are they." In the same way, an attack should be made so quickly that it cannot be parried.
20. When you plunder a countryside, let the spoil be divided among your men;
Commentary: Sun Tzu wants to reduce the abuses of indiscriminate plundering by insisting that all booty be thrown into a common stock and afterwards fairly divided among everyone.
when you capture new territory, cut it up into allotments for the benefit of the soldiers.
Commentary: Ch'en Hao says: "Quarter your soldiers on the land, and let them sow and plant it." It was by acting on this principle, and harvesting the lands they invaded, that the Chinese carried out some of their most memorable and triumphant expeditions — such as that of Pan Ch'ao, who reached the Caspian, and, in more recent years, those of Fu-k'ang-an and Tso Tsung-t'ang.
21. Ponder and deliberate before you make a move.
Commentary: Chang Yu quotes Wei Liao Tzu as saying that we must not break camp until we have gauged the enemy's power of resistance and the cleverness of the opposing general. Compare the "seven considerations" in Chapter One, verse 13.
22. He will conquer who has learned the artifice of deviation.
Commentary: See above, verses 3 and 4.
Such is the art of manoeuvring.
Commentary: With these words the chapter would naturally end. But there now follows a long appendix in the shape of an extract from an earlier book on war, now lost, but apparently still in existence when Sun Tzu wrote. The style of this fragment is not noticeably different from Sun Tzu's own, and no commentator raises any doubt about its genuineness.
23. The Book of Army Management says:
Commentary: It is perhaps significant that none of the earlier commentators tells us anything about this work. Mei Yao-ch'en calls it "an ancient military classic" and Wang Hsi "an old book on war". Considering the enormous amount of fighting that had gone on for centuries before Sun Tzu's time among the various kingdoms and principalities of China, it is not in itself improbable that a collection of military maxims should have been made and written down at some earlier period.
On the field of battle,
Commentary: Implied, though not actually in the Chinese.
the spoken word does not carry far enough: hence the institution of gongs and drums. Nor can ordinary objects be seen clearly enough: hence the institution of banners and flags.
24. Gongs and drums, banners and flags are the means by which the ears and eyes of the host may be focused on one particular point.
Commentary: Chang Yu says: "If sight and hearing converge at the same moment on the same object, the movements of as many as a million soldiers will be like those of a single man."
25. The host thus forming a single united body, it is impossible either for the brave to advance alone or for the cowardly to retreat alone.
Commentary: Chang Yu quotes the saying: "Equally guilty are those who advance against orders and those who retreat against orders." Tu Mu tells a story here about Wu Ch'i, when he was fighting the Ch'in State. Before the battle had begun, one of his soldiers, a man of matchless daring, went out by himself, took two heads from the enemy and returned to camp. Wu Ch'i had him instantly executed. An officer ventured to remonstrate: "This man was a good soldier, and ought not to have been beheaded." Wu Ch'i replied: "I fully believe he was a good soldier, but I had him beheaded because he acted without orders."
This is the art of handling large masses of men.
26. In night fighting, then, make much use of signal fires and drums; in fighting by day, of flags and banners — as a means of influencing the ears and eyes of your army.
Commentary: Ch'en Hao alludes to Li Kuang-pi's night ride to Ho-yang at the head of 500 mounted men; they made such an imposing display with torches that the rebel leader Shih Ssu-ming, though he had a large army, did not dare to dispute their passage.
27. A whole army may be robbed of its spirit;
Commentary: "In war," says Chang Yu, "if a spirit of anger can be made to run through all ranks of an army at one and the same time, its onset will be irresistible. Now the enemy's soldiers will be keenest when they have newly arrived on the scene, and so our cue is not to fight at once, but to wait until their ardour and enthusiasm have worn off, and then strike. That is how they may be robbed of their keen spirit." Li Ch'uan and others tell an anecdote, found in the Tso Chuan under year 10, section 1, about Ts'ao Kuei, a protégé of Duke Chuang of Lu. The State of Lu was attacked by Ch'i, and the duke was about to join battle at Ch'ang-cho after the first roll of the enemy's drums when Ts'ao said: "Not just yet." Only after their drums had beaten a third time did he give the word to attack. Then they fought, and the men of Ch'i were utterly defeated. Asked afterwards by the Duke what his delay had meant, Ts'ao Kuei replied: "In battle a courageous spirit is everything. The first roll of the drum tends to create that spirit, but by the second it is already waning, and after the third it is gone altogether. I attacked when their spirit was gone and ours was at its height. Hence our victory." Wu Tzu (chapter 4) puts "spirit" first among the four important influences in war, and goes on: "The value of a whole army — a mighty host of a million men — depends on one man alone: such is the influence of spirit."
a commander-in-chief may be robbed of his presence of mind.
Commentary: Chang Yu says: "Presence of mind is the general's most important asset. It is the quality that lets him discipline disorder and breathe courage into the panic-stricken." The great general Li Ching (A.D. 571–649) has a saying: "Attacking does not consist merely in assaulting walled cities or striking at an army in battle array; it must include the art of assailing the enemy's mental balance."
28. Now a soldier's spirit is keenest in the morning;
Commentary: Always provided, I suppose, that he has had breakfast. At the battle of the Trebia the Romans were foolishly made to fight fasting, while Hannibal's men had breakfasted at their leisure. See Livy, XXI, liv. 8, lv. 1 and 8.
by noon it has begun to flag; and in the evening his mind is bent only on getting back to camp.
29. So a clever general avoids an army when its spirit is keen, and attacks it when it is sluggish and inclined to turn back. This is the art of studying moods.
30. Disciplined and calm, to wait for disorder and uproar to appear among the enemy: this is the art of keeping self-possession.
31. To be near the goal while the enemy is still far from it; to wait at ease while he is toiling and struggling; to be well fed while he is starving: this is the art of husbanding your strength.
32. To refrain from intercepting an enemy whose banners are in perfect order, to refrain from attacking an army drawn up in calm and confident array: this is the art of studying circumstances.
33. It is a military axiom not to advance uphill against the enemy, nor to oppose him when he comes downhill.
34. Do not pursue an enemy who pretends to flee; do not attack soldiers whose temper is keen.
35. Do not swallow a bait offered by the enemy.
Commentary: Li Ch'uan and Tu Mu, with an extraordinary inability to see a metaphor, take these words quite literally, of food and drink poisoned by the enemy. Ch'en Hao and Chang Yu carefully point out that the saying has a wider application.
Do not interfere with an army that is returning home.
Commentary: The commentators explain this rather singular piece of advice by saying that a man whose heart is set on getting home will fight to the death against any attempt to bar his way, and is therefore too dangerous an opponent to tackle. Chang Yu quotes the words of Han Hsin: "Invincible is the soldier who has his desire and is returning home." A marvellous tale is told of Ts'ao Ts'ao's courage and resourcefulness in chapter 1 of the San Kuo Chi. In A.D. 198 he was besieging Chang Hsiu in Jang when Liu Piao sent reinforcements with a view to cutting off his retreat. Ts'ao had to draw off his troops, only to find himself hemmed in between two enemies who were guarding each end of a narrow pass he had got himself into. In this desperate plight he waited until nightfall, then bored a tunnel into the mountainside and laid an ambush in it. As soon as the whole enemy army had passed by, the hidden troops fell on its rear while Ts'ao himself turned and met his pursuers in front, so that they were thrown into confusion and destroyed. Ts'ao Ts'ao said afterwards: "The brigands tried to check my army in its retreat and brought me to battle in a desperate position: that is how I knew how to beat them."
36. When you surround an army, leave an outlet free.
Commentary: This does not mean the enemy is to be allowed to escape. The object, as Tu Mu puts it, is "to make him believe there is a road to safety, and so prevent him fighting with the courage of despair". Tu Mu adds pleasantly: "After that, you may crush him."
Do not press a desperate enemy too hard.
Commentary: Ch'en Hao quotes the saying: "Birds and beasts brought to bay will use their claws and teeth." Chang Yu says: "If your adversary has burned his boats and smashed his cooking pots, and is ready to stake everything on one battle, he must not be pushed to extremities." Ho Shih illustrates the meaning with a story from the life of Fu Yen-ch'ing. That general, together with his colleague Tu Chung-wei, was surrounded by a vastly superior army of Khitans in A.D. 945. The country was bare and desert-like, and the little Chinese force was soon in dire straits for want of water. The wells they dug ran dry, and the men were reduced to squeezing lumps of mud and sucking out the moisture. Their ranks thinned rapidly, until at last Fu Yen-ch'ing exclaimed: "We are desperate men. Far better to die for our country than to go into captivity with our hands in fetters." A strong gale happened to be blowing from the north-east, darkening the air with dense clouds of sandy dust. Tu Chung-wei was for waiting until it had died down before deciding on a final attack; but luckily another officer, Li Shou-cheng, was quicker to see an opportunity: "They are many and we are few, but in the middle of this sandstorm our numbers will not be visible; victory will go to whoever fights hardest, and the wind will be our best ally." So Fu Yen-ch'ing made a sudden and wholly unexpected onslaught with his cavalry, routed the enemy and broke through to safety.
37. Such is the art of warfare.
Commentary: The heading means literally "The Nine Variations". But since Sun Tzu does not appear to enumerate them, and since he has already told us (Chapter Five, verses 6 to 11) that such departures from the ordinary course are practically innumerable, we have little option but to follow Wang Hsi, who says that "nine" stands for an indefinitely large number: "All it means is that in warfare we ought to vary our tactics to the utmost degree… I do not know what Ts'ao Kung makes these Nine Variations out to be, but it has been suggested that they are connected with the Nine Situations" of Chapter Eleven. That is the view Chang Yu adopts. The only other possibility is that something has been lost — a supposition to which the unusual shortness of the chapter lends some weight.
1. Sun Tzu said: In war, the general receives his commands from the sovereign, gathers his army and concentrates his forces.
Commentary: Repeated from Chapter Seven, verse 1, where it is certainly more in place. It may have been interpolated here simply to give the chapter a beginning.
2. In difficult country, do not camp. Where high roads cross, join hands with your allies. Do not linger in dangerously isolated positions.
Commentary: The last of these is not one of the Nine Situations listed at the beginning of Chapter Eleven, but occurs later on (verse 43 of that chapter). Chang Yu defines it as being positioned across the frontier, in hostile territory. Li Ch'uan says it is "country in which there are no springs or wells, flocks or herds, vegetables or firewood"; Chia Lin, "country of gorges, chasms and precipices, with no road to advance by".
In hemmed-in situations you must resort to stratagem. In a desperate position you must fight.
3. There are roads that must not be followed,
Commentary: "Especially those leading through narrow defiles," says Li Ch'uan, "where an ambush is to be feared."
armies that must not be attacked,
Commentary: More correctly, perhaps: "there are times when an army must not be attacked". Ch'en Hao says: "When you see your way to gaining a trifling advantage but are powerless to inflict a real defeat, refrain from attacking, for fear of overtaxing your men's strength."
towns that must not be besieged,
Commentary: Compare Chapter Three, verse 4. Ts'ao Kung gives an interesting illustration from his own experience. Invading the territory of Hsu-chou, he ignored the city of Hua-pi, which lay directly in his path, and pressed on into the heart of the country. This excellent strategy was rewarded by the later capture of no fewer than fourteen important district cities. Chang Yu says: "No town should be attacked which, if taken, cannot be held, or which, if left alone, will cause no trouble." Hsun Ying, urged to attack Pi-yang, replied: "The city is small and well fortified; even if I succeed in taking it, it will be no great feat of arms, whereas if I fail I shall make myself a laughing stock." In the seventeenth century sieges still made up a large part of war. It was Turenne who drew attention to the importance of marches, countermarches and manoeuvres. He said: "It is a great mistake to waste men in taking a town when the same expenditure of soldiers will gain a province."
Footnote: "Marshal Turenne," p. 50.
positions that must not be contested, commands of the sovereign that must not be obeyed.
Commentary: This is a hard saying for the Chinese, with their reverence for authority, and Wei Liao Tzu (quoted by Tu Mu) is moved to exclaim: "Weapons are baleful instruments, strife is the enemy of virtue, a military commander is the negation of civil order!" The unpalatable fact remains, however, that even an Emperor's wishes must give way to military necessity.
4. The general who thoroughly understands the advantages that come with varying his tactics knows how to handle his troops.
5. The general who does not understand them may know the lie of the land perfectly well and still be unable to turn that knowledge to practical account.
Commentary: Literally, "get the advantage of the ground", which means not only securing good positions but making use of natural advantages in every possible way. Chang Yu says: "Every kind of ground has its own natural features, and each also gives scope for a certain variability of plan. How can these natural features be turned to account unless topographical knowledge is supplemented by versatility of mind?"
6. So the student of war who is unpractised in the art of varying his plans will fail to make the best use of his men, even if he knows the Five Advantages.
Commentary: Chia Lin tells us these are five obvious and generally advantageous lines of action: "If a certain road is short, it must be taken; if an army is isolated, it must be attacked; if a town is in a parlous state, it must be besieged; if a position can be stormed, the attempt must be made; and if it is consistent with military operations, the ruler's commands must be obeyed." But circumstances sometimes forbid a general to use these advantages. For instance, "a certain road may be his shortest way, but if he knows it abounds in natural obstacles, or that the enemy has laid an ambush on it, he will not take it. A hostile force may be open to attack, but if he knows it is hard pressed and likely to fight with desperation, he will hold off" — and so on.
7. So in the wise leader's plans, considerations of advantage and of disadvantage are blended together.
Commentary: "Whether you are in an advantageous position or a disadvantageous one," says Ts'ao Kung, "the opposite state should always be present to your mind."
8. If our expectation of advantage is tempered this way, we may succeed in accomplishing the essential part of our plans.
Commentary: Tu Mu says: "If we wish to wrest an advantage from the enemy, we must not fix our minds on that alone, but must allow for the possibility of the enemy doing us some harm too, and let that enter our calculations as a factor."
9. If, on the other hand, in the middle of difficulties we are always ready to seize an advantage, we may extricate ourselves from misfortune.
Commentary: Tu Mu says: "If I wish to get myself out of a dangerous position, I must consider not only the enemy's ability to injure me but my own ability to gain an advantage over him. If these two considerations are properly blended in my counsels, I shall succeed in freeing myself… For instance, if I am surrounded by the enemy and think only of escaping, the nervelessness of my policy will encourage my adversary to pursue and crush me; it would be far better to urge my men to a bold counter-attack, and use the advantage so gained to free myself from the enemy's toils." See the story of Ts'ao Ts'ao in Chapter Seven, verse 35, note.
10. Reduce the hostile chieftains by inflicting damage on them;
Commentary: Chia Lin lists several ways of inflicting this injury, some of which would occur only to the Oriental mind: "Entice away the enemy's best and wisest men, so that he is left without counsellors. Introduce traitors into his country, so that his government's policy comes to nothing. Foment intrigue and deceit, and so sow dissension between the ruler and his ministers. By every artful contrivance, cause deterioration among his men and waste of his treasure. Corrupt his morals with insidious gifts that lead him into excess. Disturb and unsettle his mind by presenting him with lovely women." Chang Yu, following Wang Hsi, reads Sun Tzu differently here: "Get the enemy into a position where he must suffer injury, and he will submit of his own accord."
and make trouble for them,
Commentary: Tu Mu takes this phrase to mean that trouble should be made for the enemy in his "possessions", or, as we might say, his assets — which he considers to be "a large army, a rich treasury, harmony among the soldiers, punctual carrying out of commands". These give us the whip hand over him.
and keep them constantly occupied;
Commentary: Literally, "make servants of them". Tu Yu says: "Prevent them from having any rest."
hold out specious attractions, and make them rush to any given point.
Commentary: Meng Shih's note contains an excellent example of the idiomatic use of this phrase: "cause them to forget pien" — the reasons for acting otherwise than on their first impulse — "and hasten in our direction".
11. The art of war teaches us to rely not on the likelihood of the enemy not coming, but on our own readiness to receive him; not on the chance of his not attacking, but on the fact that we have made our position unassailable.
12. There are five dangerous faults that may affect a general. (1) Recklessness, which leads to destruction;
Commentary: "Bravery without forethought", as Ts'ao Kung analyses it, which makes a man fight blindly and desperately like a mad bull. Such an opponent, says Chang Yu, "must not be met with brute force, but may be lured into an ambush and killed". Compare Wu Tzu, chapter 4, at the beginning: "In estimating a general's character, men are apt to pay exclusive attention to his courage, forgetting that courage is only one of the many qualities a general should have. The merely brave man is prone to fight recklessly; and the man who fights recklessly, with no sense of what is expedient, must be condemned." The Ssu-ma Fa also makes the incisive remark: "Simply going to one's death does not bring victory."
(2) cowardice, which leads to capture;
Commentary: Ts'ao Kung defines the Chinese word translated here as "cowardice" as belonging to the man "whom timidity prevents from advancing to seize an advantage", and Wang Hsi adds, "who is quick to run at the sight of danger". Meng Shih gives the closer paraphrase "he who is bent on returning alive" — that is, the man who will never take a risk. But as Sun Tzu knew, nothing is achieved in war unless you are willing to take risks. T'ai Kung said: "He who lets an advantage slip will afterwards bring real disaster on himself." In A.D. 404 Liu Yu pursued the rebel Huan Hsuan up the Yangtse and fought a naval battle with him at the island of Ch'eng-hung. The loyal troops numbered only a few thousand, while their opponents were in great force. But Huan Hsuan, fearing the fate in store for him if he were beaten, had a light boat made fast to the side of his war junk so that he could escape at a moment's notice. The natural result was that his soldiers' fighting spirit was utterly quenched; and when the loyalists attacked from windward with fireships, every man striving to be first into the fray, Huan Hsuan's forces were routed, had to burn all their baggage, and fled for two days and nights without stopping. Chang Yu tells a similar story of Chao Ying-ch'i, a general of the Chin State, who during a battle with the army of Ch'u in 597 B.C. had a boat kept ready for him on the river, wishing to be the first across in case of defeat.
(3) a hasty temper, which can be provoked by insults;
Commentary: Tu Mu tells us that Yao Hsiang, opposed in A.D. 357 by Huang Mei, Teng Ch'iang and others, shut himself up behind his walls and refused to fight. Teng Ch'iang said: "Our adversary has a choleric temper and is easily provoked; let us make constant sallies and break down his walls, and he will grow angry and come out. Once we can bring his force to battle, it is bound to be our prey." The plan was acted on; Yao Hsiang came out to fight, was lured as far as San-yuan by the enemy's pretended flight, and was finally attacked and killed.
(4) a delicacy of honour that is sensitive to shame;
Commentary: This need not be taken to mean that a sense of honour is really a defect in a general. What Sun Tzu condemns is rather an exaggerated sensitiveness to slanderous reports — the thin-skinned man who is stung by abuse, however undeserved. Mei Yao-ch'en observes truly, if a little paradoxically: "The seeker after glory should be careless of public opinion."
(5) over-solicitude for his men, which exposes him to worry and trouble.
Commentary: Here again Sun Tzu does not mean that the general should be careless of his troops' welfare. All he wants to stress is the danger of sacrificing any important military advantage to his men's immediate comfort. That is a short-sighted policy, because in the long run the troops will suffer more from the defeat, or at best the prolonging of the war, that follows from it. A mistaken feeling of pity will often lead a general to relieve a besieged city, or reinforce a hard-pressed detachment, against his military instincts. It is now generally admitted that our repeated efforts to relieve Ladysmith in the South African War were so many strategic blunders that defeated their own purpose. And in the end relief came through the very man who set out with the firm resolve to stop subordinating the interests of the whole to sentiment in favour of a part. An old soldier of one of our generals who failed most conspicuously in that war once tried, I remember, to defend him to me on the ground that he was always "so good to his men". By that plea, had he only known it, he was condemning him out of Sun Tzu's own mouth.
13. These are the five besetting sins of a general, ruinous to the conduct of war.
14. When an army is overthrown and its leader killed, the cause will surely be found among these five dangerous faults. Let them be a subject for meditation.
Commentary: The contents of this interesting chapter are better indicated by verse 1 than by the heading.
1. Sun Tzu said: We come now to the question of encamping the army and observing signs of the enemy. Pass quickly over mountains, and keep near valleys.
Commentary: The idea is not to linger among barren uplands but to stay close to supplies of water and grass. Compare Wu Tzu, chapter 3: "Do not stay in natural ovens" — that is, in the mouths of valleys. Chang Yu tells this anecdote. Wu-tu Ch'iang was a robber captain in the time of the Later Han, and Ma Yuan was sent to wipe out his gang. Ch'iang took refuge in the hills, and Ma Yuan made no attempt to force a battle but seized all the favourable positions commanding water and forage. Ch'iang was soon in such desperate straits for provisions that he had to surrender outright. He did not know the advantage of keeping near valleys.
2. Camp in high places,
Commentary: Not on high hills, but on knolls or hillocks raised above the surrounding country.
facing the sun.
Commentary: Tu Mu takes this to mean "facing south" and Ch'en Hao "facing east". Compare below, verses 11 and 13.
Do not climb heights in order to fight. So much for mountain warfare.
3. After crossing a river, you should get well away from it.
Commentary: "In order to tempt the enemy to cross after you," according to Ts'ao Kung, and also, says Chang Yu, "in order not to be hampered in your movements". The T'ung Tien reads, "If the enemy crosses a river", and so on. But in view of the next sentence this is almost certainly an interpolation.
4. When an invading force crosses a river on its way towards you, do not go to meet it in midstream. It is best to let half the army get across, and then attack.
Commentary: Li Ch'uan alludes to the great victory Han Hsin won over Lung Chu at the Wei River. Turning to the Ch'ien Han Shu, chapter 34, folio 6 verso, we find the battle described as follows. The two armies were drawn up on opposite banks. In the night Han Hsin ordered his men to take some ten thousand sacks filled with sand and build a dam higher upstream. Then, leading half his army across, he attacked Lung Chu; but after a while, pretending to have failed, he withdrew hastily to the other bank. Lung Chu, much elated by this unlooked-for success, exclaimed, "I was sure Han Hsin was really a coward!" and pursued him, beginning to cross the river in his turn. Han Hsin now sent a party to cut the sandbags open, releasing a great volume of water that swept down and stopped the greater part of Lung Chu's army from getting across. He then turned on the force that had been cut off and annihilated it, Lung Chu himself among the slain. The rest of the army, on the far bank, scattered and fled in all directions.
5. If you are anxious to fight, you should not go to meet the invader near a river he has to cross.
Commentary: For fear of preventing his crossing.
6. Moor your craft higher upstream than the enemy's, and facing the sun.
Commentary: See above, verse 2. The repetition of these words in connection with water is very awkward. Chang Yu notes: "Said either of troops drawn up on the riverbank, or of boats anchored in the stream itself; in either case it is essential to be higher than the enemy and facing the sun." The other commentators are not at all explicit.
Do not move upstream to meet the enemy.
Commentary: Tu Mu says: "As water flows downwards, we must not pitch camp on the lower reaches of a river, for fear the enemy should open the sluices and sweep us away in a flood. Chu-ko Wu-hou remarked that 'in river warfare we must not advance against the stream', which amounts to saying that our fleet must not anchor below the enemy's, or they will be able to use the current and make short work of us." There is also the danger, noted by other commentators, that the enemy may throw poison into the water to be carried down to us.
So much for river warfare.
7. In crossing salt marshes, your only concern should be to get over them quickly, without any delay.
Commentary: Because of the lack of fresh water, the poor quality of the herbage, and, not least, because they are low, flat and exposed to attack.
8. If you are forced to fight in a salt marsh, you should have water and grass near you and get your back to a clump of trees.
Commentary: Li Ch'uan remarks that the ground is less likely to be treacherous where there are trees, while Tu Mu says they will protect the rear.
So much for operations in salt marshes.
9. In dry, level country, take up an easily accessible position with rising ground to your right and behind you,
Commentary: Tu Mu quotes T'ai Kung: "An army should have a stream or a marsh on its left and a hill or mound on its right."
so that the danger is in front and safety behind. So much for campaigning in flat country.
10. These are the four useful branches of military knowledge
Commentary: Those concerned with (1) mountains, (2) rivers, (3) marshes and (4) plains. Compare Napoleon's "Military Maxims," no. 1.
which enabled the Yellow Emperor to defeat four several sovereigns.
Commentary: About the Yellow Emperor: Mei Yao-ch'en asks, with some plausibility, whether there is an error in the text, since nothing is known of Huang Ti having conquered four other Emperors. The Shih Chi, chapter 1, at the beginning, speaks only of his victories over Yen Ti and Ch'ih Yu. The Liu T'ao mentions that he "fought seventy battles and pacified the Empire". Ts'ao Kung explains that the Yellow Emperor was the first to institute the feudal system of vassal princes, each of whom — four in number — originally bore the title of Emperor. Li Ch'uan tells us that the art of war began under Huang Ti, who received it from his minister Feng Hou.
11. All armies prefer high ground to low,
Commentary: "High ground," says Mei Yao-ch'en, "is not only pleasanter and healthier but more convenient from a military point of view; low ground is not only damp and unhealthy but also bad for fighting."
and sunny places to dark.
12. If you take care of your men,
Commentary: Ts'ao Kung says: "Make for fresh water and pasture, where you can turn the animals out to graze."
and camp on hard ground, the army will be free of every kind of disease,
Commentary: Chang Yu says: "The dryness of the ground will prevent illness breaking out."
and that will mean victory.
13. When you come to a hill or a bank, occupy the sunny side, with the slope on your right rear. So you will at once act for your soldiers' benefit and use the natural advantages of the ground.
14. When heavy rain upcountry has swollen a river you want to ford, and it is flecked with foam, you must wait until it goes down.
15. Country with precipitous cliffs and torrents running between them, deep natural hollows,
Commentary: The last defined as "places enclosed on every side by steep banks, with pools of water at the bottom".
confined places,
Commentary: Defined as "natural pens or prisons", or "places surrounded by precipices on three sides — easy to get into, hard to get out of".
tangled thickets,
Commentary: Defined as "places covered with undergrowth so dense that spears cannot be used".
quagmires
Commentary: Defined as "low-lying places so heavy with mud that they are impassable for chariots and horsemen".
and crevasses,
Commentary: Defined by Mei Yao-ch'en as "a narrow difficult way between overhanging cliffs". Tu Mu's note is "ground covered with trees and rocks, and cut up by numerous ravines and pitfalls". This is very vague, but Chia Lin explains it clearly enough as a defile or narrow pass, and Chang Yu takes much the same view. On the whole the weight of the commentators certainly inclines to "defile". But the ordinary meaning of the Chinese in one place is "a crack or fissure", and that, together with the fact that the sense elsewhere in the sentence points to something like a defile, makes me think Sun Tzu is speaking here of crevasses.
should be left with all possible speed and not approached.
16. While we keep away from such places, we should get the enemy to approach them; while we face them, we should let the enemy have them at his back.
17. If there is any hilly country near your camp, or ponds surrounded by water grass, or hollow basins full of reeds, or woods with thick undergrowth, they must be carefully beaten and searched; for these are the places where men in ambush or insidious spies are likely to be lurking.
Commentary: Chang Yu notes: "We must also be on our guard against traitors lying in close cover, secretly spying out our weaknesses and overhearing our instructions."
18. When the enemy is close at hand and stays quiet, he is relying on the natural strength of his position.
Commentary: Here begin Sun Tzu's remarks on reading signs, much of which is so good that it could almost be included in a modern manual like General Baden-Powell's "Aids to Scouting".
19. When he keeps his distance and tries to provoke a battle, he is anxious for the other side to advance.
Commentary: Probably because we are in a strong position he wants to dislodge us from. "If he came close up to us," says Tu Mu, "and tried to force a battle, he would seem to despise us, and we should be less likely to take up the challenge."
20. If his camp is easy to get at, he is offering a bait.
21. Movement among the trees of a forest shows that the enemy is advancing.
Commentary: Ts'ao Kung explains this as "felling trees to clear a passage", and Chang Yu says: "Every commander sends out scouts to climb high places and observe the enemy. If a scout sees that the trees of a forest are moving and shaking, he knows they are being cut down to clear a passage for the enemy's march."
The appearance of a number of screens in the middle of thick grass means the enemy wants to make us suspicious.
Commentary: Tu Yu's explanation, borrowed from Ts'ao Kung's, is this: "The presence of a number of screens or sheds in the middle of thick vegetation is a sure sign that the enemy has fled and, fearing pursuit, has built these hiding places to make us suspect an ambush." It seems these screens were hastily knotted together out of whatever long grass the retreating enemy came across.
22. Birds rising in flight are the sign of an ambush.
Commentary: Chang Yu's explanation is doubtless right: "When birds flying along in a straight line suddenly shoot upwards, it means soldiers are in ambush at the spot beneath."
Startled beasts mean that a sudden attack is coming.
23. Dust rising in a high column is the sign of chariots advancing; when the dust is low but spread over a wide area, it means infantry approaching.
Commentary: "High and sharp", or rising to a peak, is of course somewhat exaggerated as applied to dust. The commentators explain the phenomenon by saying that horses and chariots, being heavier than men, raise more dust, and also follow one another in the same wheel track, whereas foot soldiers march in ranks many abreast. According to Chang Yu, "every army on the march must have scouts some way ahead, who on sighting dust raised by the enemy will gallop back and report it to the commander-in-chief". Compare General Baden-Powell: "As you move along, say, in a hostile country, your eyes should be looking afar for the enemy or any signs of him: figures, dust rising, birds getting up, glitter of arms, and so on."
Footnote: "Aids to Scouting," p. 26.
When the dust branches out in different directions, it shows that parties have been sent to collect firewood. A few clouds of dust moving to and fro mean that the army is making camp.
Commentary: Chang Yu says: "In laying out the defences of a camp, light horse will be sent to survey the position and find the weak and strong points all round its circumference. Hence the small quantity of dust, and its motion."
24. Humble words and increased preparations are signs that the enemy is about to advance.
Commentary: "As though they stood in great fear of us," says Tu Mu. "Their object is to make us contemptuous and careless, and then attack." Chang Yu alludes to the story of T'ien Tan of Chi-mo against the Yen forces under Ch'i Chieh. In chapter 82 of the Shih Chi we read: T'ien Tan said openly, "My only fear is that the Yen army may cut off the noses of their Ch'i prisoners and put them in the front rank to fight against us; that would be the undoing of our city." The other side, hearing of this, acted at once on the suggestion; but the people inside the city were enraged at seeing their countrymen mutilated, and, fearing nothing so much as falling into the enemy's hands themselves, were nerved to defend the place more stubbornly than ever. Again T'ien Tan sent back converted spies who reported these words to the enemy: "What I dread most is that the men of Yen may dig up the ancestral tombs outside the town, and by that indignity to our forefathers make us faint-hearted." At once the besiegers dug up all the graves and burned the corpses in them. And the people of Chi-mo, watching the outrage from the walls, wept passionately and were all impatient to go out and fight, their fury increased tenfold. T'ien Tan knew then that his soldiers were ready for anything. But instead of a sword he took a mattock in his own hands, and had others handed out to his best warriors, while the ranks were filled up with their wives and concubines. He then served out all the remaining rations and told his men to eat their fill. The regular soldiers were kept out of sight, and the walls were manned with the old and weak and with women. That done, envoys were sent to the enemy's camp to arrange terms of surrender, and the Yen army began shouting for joy. T'ien Tan also collected 20,000 ounces of silver from the people and got the wealthy citizens of Chi-mo to send it to the Yen general, praying that when the town capitulated he would not let their homes be plundered or their women maltreated. Ch'i Chieh, in high good humour, granted the prayer; but his army now grew steadily slacker and more careless. Meanwhile T'ien Tan got together a thousand oxen, decked them with pieces of red silk, painted their bodies with coloured stripes like dragons, fastened sharp blades to their horns and well-greased rushes to their tails. When night came he lit the ends of the rushes and drove the oxen out through a number of holes he had pierced in the walls, backing them up with a force of 5,000 picked warriors. The animals, maddened with pain, dashed furiously into the enemy's camp and caused the utmost confusion and dismay; their tails acted as torches, showing up the hideous pattern on their bodies, and the weapons on their horns killed or wounded anyone they touched. Meanwhile the band of 5,000 had crept up with gags in their mouths, and now threw themselves on the enemy. At the same moment a frightful din arose in the city itself, everyone left behind making as much noise as possible by banging drums and hammering on bronze vessels, until heaven and earth were convulsed with the uproar. Terror-stricken, the Yen army fled in disorder, hotly pursued by the men of Ch'i, who killed their general Ch'i Chieh… The result of the battle was the eventual recovery of some seventy cities that had belonged to the Ch'i State.
Violent language and driving forward as if to attack are signs that he will retreat.
25. When the light chariots come out first and take up position on the wings, it is a sign that the enemy is forming for battle.
26. Peace proposals unaccompanied by a sworn covenant indicate a plot.
Commentary: The reading here is uncertain. Li Ch'uan takes it as "a treaty confirmed by oaths and hostages". Wang Hsi and Chang Yu, on the other hand, simply say "without reason", "on a frivolous pretext".
27. When there is much running about
Commentary: Every man hurrying to his proper place under his own regimental banner.
and the soldiers fall into rank, it means the critical moment has come.
28. When some are seen advancing and some retreating, it is a lure.
29. When the soldiers stand leaning on their spears, they are faint from want of food.
30. If those sent to draw water begin by drinking themselves, the army is suffering from thirst.
Commentary: As Tu Mu remarks: "One may know the condition of a whole army from the behaviour of a single man."
31. If the enemy sees an advantage to be gained and makes no effort to take it, his soldiers are exhausted.
32. If birds gather on a spot, it is unoccupied.
Commentary: A useful fact to bear in mind when, as Ch'en Hao says, the enemy has secretly abandoned his camp.
Clamour by night means nervousness.
33. If there is disturbance in the camp, the general's authority is weak. If the banners and flags are shifted about, sedition is afoot. If the officers are angry, it means the men are weary.
Commentary: Tu Mu reads the sentence differently: "If all the officers of an army are angry with their general, it means they are broken with fatigue" — from the exertions he has demanded of them.
34. When an army feeds its horses with grain and kills its cattle for food,
Commentary: In the ordinary course of things the men would be fed on grain and the horses chiefly on grass.
and when the men do not hang their cooking pots over the camp fires, showing that they will not be returning to their tents, you may know they are determined to fight to the death.
Commentary: I may quote here the illustrative passage from the Hou Han Shu, chapter 71, given in abbreviated form by the P'ei Wen Yun Fu: The rebel Wang Kuo of Liang was besieging the town of Ch'en-ts'ang, and Huang-fu Sung, who was in supreme command, and Tung Cho were sent out against him. Tung Cho pressed for hasty measures, but Sung turned a deaf ear. At last the rebels were utterly worn out and began throwing down their weapons of their own accord. Sung was for advancing to the attack, but Cho said: "It is a principle of war not to pursue desperate men and not to press a retreating host." Sung answered: "That does not apply here. What I am about to attack is a jaded army, not a retreating host; with disciplined troops I am falling on a disorganized multitude, not a band of desperate men." So he advanced to the attack unsupported by his colleague, and routed the enemy, Wang Kuo being killed.
35. The sight of men whispering together in small knots, or speaking in low tones, points to disaffection among the rank and file.
36. Too frequent rewards mean the enemy is at the end of his resources;
Commentary: Because when an army is hard pressed, as Tu Mu says, there is always a fear of mutiny, and lavish rewards are given to keep the men in good temper.
too many punishments betray a condition of dire distress.
Commentary: Because in such a case discipline grows slack, and unusual severity is needed to keep the men to their duty.
37. To begin with bluster and afterwards take fright at the enemy's numbers shows a supreme lack of intelligence.
Commentary: I follow Ts'ao Kung's reading, also adopted by Li Ch'uan, Tu Mu and Chang Yu. Another possible meaning, set out by Tu Yu, Chia Lin, Mei Yao-ch'en and Wang Hsi, is: "The general who is first tyrannical towards his men and then in terror lest they should mutiny." That would connect the sentence with what went before about rewards and punishments.
38. When envoys are sent with compliments in their mouths, it is a sign that the enemy wants a truce.
Commentary: Tu Mu says: "If the enemy opens friendly relations by sending hostages, it is a sign that they are anxious for an armistice, either because their strength is exhausted or for some other reason." But it hardly takes a Sun Tzu to draw so obvious an inference.
39. If the enemy's troops march up angrily and stand facing ours for a long time without either joining battle or going away again, the situation is one that demands great vigilance and circumspection.
Commentary: Ts'ao Kung says a manoeuvre of this sort may be only a ruse to gain time for an unexpected flank attack or the laying of an ambush.
40. If our troops are no more numerous than the enemy's, that is quite enough; it only means that no direct attack can be made.
Commentary: Literally, "no martial advance". That is to say, cheng tactics and frontal attacks must be avoided, and stratagem used instead.
What we can do is simply concentrate all our available strength, keep a close watch on the enemy, and get reinforcements.
Commentary: This is an obscure sentence, and none of the commentators manages to squeeze very good sense out of it. I follow Li Ch'uan, who seems to offer the simplest explanation: "Only the side that gets more men will win." Fortunately Chang Yu expounds it in language that is lucidity itself: "When the numbers are even and no favourable opening presents itself, we may not be strong enough to deliver a sustained attack, but we can find extra recruits among our suppliers and camp followers, and then, concentrating our forces and keeping a close watch on the enemy, contrive to snatch the victory. But we must avoid borrowing foreign soldiers to help us." He then quotes Wei Liao Tzu, chapter 3: "The nominal strength of mercenary troops may be 100,000, but their real value will be no more than half that."
41. He who exercises no forethought and makes light of his opponents is sure to be captured by them.
Commentary: Ch'en Hao, quoting the Tso Chuan, says: "If bees and scorpions carry poison, how much more a hostile state!" Even a puny opponent, then, should not be treated with contempt.
42. If soldiers are punished before they have grown attached to you, they will not be submissive; and if they are not submissive, they will be practically useless. If, once they have grown attached to you, punishments are not enforced, they will still be useless.
43. So soldiers must be treated in the first place with humanity, but kept under control by iron discipline.
Commentary: Yen Tzu (493 B.C.) said of Ssu-ma Jang-chu: "His civil virtues endeared him to the people; his martial prowess kept his enemies in awe." Compare Wu Tzu, chapter 4, at the beginning: "The ideal commander unites culture with a warlike temper; the profession of arms requires a combination of hardness and tenderness."
This is a certain road to victory.
44. If commands are habitually enforced in training the soldiers, the army will be well disciplined; if not, its discipline will be bad.
45. If a general shows confidence in his men but always insists on his orders being obeyed,
Commentary: Tu Mu says: "In time of peace a general ought to show kindly confidence in his men and also make his authority respected, so that when they come to face the enemy his orders are carried out and discipline is maintained, because they all trust and look up to him." What Sun Tzu says in verse 44, however, would lead one rather to expect something like: "If a general is always confident that his orders will be carried out," and so on.
the gain will be mutual.
Commentary: Chang Yu says: "The general has confidence in the men under his command, and the men are docile, having confidence in him. So the gain is mutual." He quotes a pregnant sentence from Wei Liao Tzu, chapter 4: "The art of giving orders is not to try to rectify minor blunders and not to be swayed by petty doubts." Vacillation and fussiness are the surest way of sapping an army's confidence.
Commentary: Only about a third of the chapter, verses 1 to 13, deals with terrain; the subject is treated more fully in Chapter Eleven. The "six calamities" are discussed in verses 14 to 20, and the rest of the chapter is again a string of desultory remarks — though perhaps no less interesting for that.
1. Sun Tzu said: We may distinguish six kinds of terrain, namely: (1) accessible ground;
Commentary: Mei Yao-ch'en says: "plentifully provided with roads and means of communication."
(2) entangling ground;
Commentary: The same commentator says: "Net-like country, which you become entangled in if you venture into it."
(3) temporising ground;
Commentary: Ground that allows you to stave things off, or delay.
(4) narrow passes; (5) precipitous heights; (6) positions at a great distance from the enemy.
Commentary: It is hardly necessary to point out how faulty this classification is. A strange lack of logical perception shows in the way Chinese writers accept, without question, glaring cross-divisions like this one.
2. Ground that both sides can cross freely is called accessible.
3. On ground of this kind, be ahead of the enemy in occupying the raised and sunny spots, and guard your line of supply carefully.
Commentary: The general sense of that last phrase is doubtless, as Tu Yu says, "not to allow the enemy to cut your communications". In view of Napoleon's dictum that "the secret of war lies in the communications", we could wish Sun Tzu had done more than skirt the edge of this important subject, here and in Chapter One verse 10 and Chapter Seven verse 11. Colonel Henderson says: "The line of supply may be said to be as vital to the existence of an army as the heart to the life of a human being. Just as the duellist who finds his adversary's point menacing him with certain death, and his own guard astray, is compelled to conform to his adversary's movements and content himself with warding off the thrusts, so the commander whose communications are suddenly threatened finds himself in a false position, and he will be fortunate if he does not have to change all his plans, split his force into more or less isolated detachments, and fight with inferior numbers on ground he has had no time to prepare, where defeat will not be an ordinary failure but will entail the ruin or surrender of his whole army."
Footnote: See "Pensees de Napoleon 1er," no. 47.
Footnote: "The Science of War," chapter 2.
Then you will be able to fight with advantage.
4. Ground that can be abandoned but is hard to reoccupy is called entangling.
5. From a position of this sort, if the enemy is unprepared, you may sally out and beat him. But if he is ready for your coming and you fail to beat him, then, since return is impossible, disaster will follow.
6. When the position is such that neither side will gain by moving first, it is called temporising ground.
Commentary: Tu Mu says: "Each side finds it inconvenient to move, and the situation stays deadlocked."
7. In a position of this sort, even if the enemy offers an attractive bait,
Commentary: Tu Yu says, "turning their backs on us and pretending to flee". But that is only one of the lures that might tempt us to leave our position.
it will be as well not to stir, but rather to retreat, and so entice the enemy out in his turn; then, when part of his army has come out, we may attack to advantage.
8. As for narrow passes, if you can occupy them first, garrison them strongly and wait for the enemy to come.
Commentary: Because then, as Tu Yu observes, "the initiative will lie with us, and by making sudden and unexpected attacks we shall have the enemy at our mercy".
9. If the enemy occupies a pass before you, do not go after him if it is fully garrisoned — only if it is weakly garrisoned.
10. As for precipitous heights, if you get there before your adversary, occupy the raised and sunny spots and wait for him there.
Commentary: Ts'ao Kung says: "The particular advantage of securing heights and defiles is that your actions cannot then be dictated by the enemy." (For the grand principle alluded to, see Chapter Six, verse 2.) Chang Yu tells this anecdote of P'ei Hsing-chien (A.D. 619–682), who was sent on a punitive expedition against the Turkic tribes. At night he pitched camp as usual, and it had already been completely fortified with wall and ditch, when he suddenly ordered the army to shift quarters to a nearby hill. His officers were highly displeased and protested loudly at the extra fatigue this would cost the men. P'ei Hsing-chien paid no heed to their complaints and had the camp moved as quickly as possible. That same night a terrific storm came on, flooding their former camping ground to a depth of more than twelve feet. The recalcitrant officers were amazed at the sight and admitted they had been wrong. "How did you know what was going to happen?" they asked. P'ei Hsing-chien replied: "From this time on, be content to obey orders without asking unnecessary questions." "From this," Chang Yu goes on, "it may be seen that high and sunny places are advantageous not only for fighting but because they are safe from disastrous floods."
11. If the enemy has occupied them before you, do not follow him; retreat and try to entice him away.
Commentary: The turning point of Li Shih-min's campaign of A.D. 621 against the two rebels Tou Chien-te, King of Hsia, and Wang Shih-ch'ung, Prince of Cheng, was his seizure of the heights of Wu-lao. In spite of it Tou Chien-te persisted in trying to relieve his ally in Lo-yang, and was defeated and taken prisoner. See the Chiu T'ang Shu, chapter 2, folio 5 verso, and also chapter 54.
12. If you are a great distance from the enemy and the two armies are equal in strength, it is not easy to provoke a battle,
Commentary: The point is that we must not think of undertaking a long and wearisome march, at the end of which, as Tu Yu says, "we should be exhausted and our adversary fresh and keen".
and fighting will be to your disadvantage.
13. These six are the principles connected with Earth.
Commentary: Or perhaps "the principles relating to ground". See, however, Chapter One, verse 8.
The general who has reached a responsible post must study them carefully.
14. Now an army is exposed to six several calamities that arise not from natural causes but from faults the general is responsible for. They are: (1) flight; (2) insubordination; (3) collapse; (4) ruin; (5) disorganisation; (6) rout.
15. Other conditions being equal, if one force is hurled against another ten times its size, the result will be the flight of the first.
16. When the common soldiers are too strong and their officers too weak, the result is insubordination.
Commentary: Tu Mu cites the unhappy case of T'ien Pu (Hsin T'ang Shu, chapter 148), who was sent to Wei in A.D. 821 with orders to lead an army against Wang T'ing-ts'ou. The whole time he was in command his soldiers treated him with the utmost contempt and openly flouted his authority by riding about the camp on donkeys, several thousand at a time. T'ien Pu was powerless to stop it; and when, after some months, he tried to engage the enemy, his troops turned tail and scattered in every direction. After that the unfortunate man cut his own throat.
When the officers are too strong and the common soldiers too weak, the result is collapse.
Commentary: Ts'ao Kung says: "The officers are energetic and want to press on, the common soldiers are feeble and suddenly collapse."
17. When the higher officers are angry and insubordinate, and on meeting the enemy give battle on their own account out of resentment, before the commander-in-chief can tell whether or not he is in a position to fight, the result is ruin.
Commentary: Wang Hsi's note is: "This means the general is angry without cause and at the same time does not appreciate the ability of his subordinate officers; so he stirs up fierce resentment and brings an avalanche of ruin on his own head."
18. When the general is weak and without authority; when his orders are not clear and distinct;
Commentary: Wei Liao Tzu, chapter 4, says: "If the commander gives his orders with decision, the soldiers will not wait to hear them twice; if his moves are made without vacillation, the soldiers will not be in two minds about doing their duty." General Baden-Powell says, italicizing the words: "The secret of getting successful work out of your trained men lies in one nutshell — in the clearness of the instructions they receive." Compare also Wu Tzu, chapter 3: "The most fatal defect in a military leader is indecision; the worst calamities that befall an army arise from hesitation."
Footnote: "Aids to Scouting," p. xii.
when officers and men have no fixed duties assigned to them,
Commentary: Tu Mu says: "Neither officers nor men have any regular routine."
and the ranks are formed in a slovenly, haphazard way, the result is utter disorganisation.
19. When a general, unable to estimate the enemy's strength, lets an inferior force engage a larger one, or hurls a weak detachment against a powerful one, and fails to put picked soldiers in the front rank, the result must be a rout.
Commentary: Chang Yu paraphrases the second half of the sentence and goes on: "Whenever there is fighting to be done, the keenest spirits should be appointed to serve in the front ranks, both to strengthen the resolution of our own men and to demoralize the enemy." Compare the primi ordines of Caesar ("De Bello Gallico," V. 28, 44, and elsewhere).
20. These are six ways of courting defeat, and must be carefully noted by the general who has reached a responsible post.
Commentary: See above, verse 13.
21. The natural formation of the country is the soldier's best ally;
Commentary: Ch'en Hao says: "The advantages of weather and season are not equal to those of ground."
but the power of estimating an adversary, of controlling the forces of victory, and of shrewdly calculating difficulties, dangers and distances, is the test of a great general.
22. He who knows these things and puts his knowledge into practice in his fighting will win his battles. He who does not know them, and does not practise them, will surely be defeated.
23. If fighting is sure to result in victory, then you must fight, even though the ruler forbids it; if fighting will not result in victory, then you must not fight, even at the ruler's bidding.
Commentary: Compare the end of Chapter Eight, verse 3. Huang Shih-kung of the Ch'in dynasty, who is said to have been Chang Liang's patron and to have written the San Lueh, has these words attributed to him: "The responsibility for setting an army in motion must rest on the general alone; if advance and retreat are controlled from the Palace, brilliant results will hardly be achieved. So the god-like ruler and the enlightened monarch are content to play a humble part in furthering their country's cause" — literally, to kneel down and push the chariot wheel. This means that in matters outside the women's quarters the military commander's decision must be absolute. Chang Yu also quotes the saying: "Decrees from the Son of Heaven do not penetrate the walls of a camp."
24. The general who advances without coveting fame and retreats without fearing disgrace,
Commentary: It was Wellington, I think, who said that the hardest thing of all for a soldier is to retreat.
whose only thought is to protect his country and serve his sovereign well, is the jewel of the kingdom.
Commentary: A noble presentation, in a few words, of the Chinese "happy warrior". Such a man, says Ho Shih, "even if he had to suffer punishment, would not regret his conduct".
25. Regard your soldiers as your children, and they will follow you into the deepest valleys; look on them as your own beloved sons, and they will stand by you even to death.
Commentary: Compare Chapter One, verse 6. Here Tu Mu draws an engaging picture of the famous general Wu Ch'i, from whose treatise on war I have often had occasion to quote: "He wore the same clothes and ate the same food as the meanest of his soldiers, refused to have either a horse to ride or a mat to sleep on, carried his own surplus rations wrapped in a parcel, and shared every hardship with his men. One of his soldiers had an abscess, and Wu Ch'i himself sucked out the poison. The soldier's mother, hearing of it, began wailing and lamenting. Somebody asked her: 'Why do you cry? Your son is only a common soldier, and the commander-in-chief himself has sucked the poison from his sore.' The woman replied: 'Many years ago Lord Wu did the same service for my husband, who never left him afterwards, and finally met his death at the enemy's hands. And now that he has done the same for my son, my son too will fall fighting, I know not where.'" Li Ch'uan mentions the Viscount of Ch'u, who invaded the small state of Hsiao in winter. The Duke of Shen said to him: "Many of the soldiers are suffering severely from the cold." So he made a round of the whole army, comforting and encouraging the men; and at once they felt as though they were dressed in garments lined with floss silk.
26. If, however, you are indulgent but cannot make your authority felt; kind-hearted but unable to enforce your commands; and incapable, besides, of quelling disorder — then your soldiers must be compared to spoilt children. They are useless for any practical purpose.
Commentary: Li Ching once said that if you could make your soldiers afraid of you, they would not be afraid of the enemy. Tu Mu recalls an instance of stern military discipline from A.D. 219, when Lu Meng was occupying the town of Chiang-ling. He had given his army stringent orders not to molest the inhabitants or take anything from them by force. Nevertheless a certain officer under his command, who happened to be a fellow townsman, took a bamboo hat belonging to one of the people in order to wear it over his regulation helmet against the rain. Lu Meng held that being a fellow native of Ju-nan could not excuse a clear breach of discipline, and ordered his summary execution — the tears rolling down his own face as he did it. This act of severity filled the army with wholesome awe, and from that time on even articles dropped in the highway were not picked up.
27. If we know that our own men are in a condition to attack, but do not know that the enemy is not open to attack, we have gone only halfway to victory.
Commentary: That is, as Ts'ao Kung says, "the issue in this case is uncertain".
28. If we know that the enemy is open to attack, but do not know that our own men are not in a condition to attack, we have gone only halfway to victory.
Commentary: Compare Chapter Three, verse 13 (1).
29. If we know that the enemy is open to attack and that our men are in a condition to attack, but do not know that the nature of the ground makes fighting impracticable, we have still gone only halfway to victory.
30. So the experienced soldier, once in motion, is never bewildered; once he has broken camp, he is never at a loss.
Commentary: The reason being, according to Tu Mu, that he has taken his measures so thoroughly as to make victory certain beforehand. "He does not move recklessly," says Chang Yu, "so when he does move he makes no mistakes."
31. Hence the saying: If you know the enemy and know yourself, your victory will not be in doubt; if you know Heaven and know Earth, you may make your victory complete.
Commentary: Li Ch'uan sums up: "Given a knowledge of three things — the affairs of men, the seasons of heaven and the natural advantages of earth — victory will always crown your battles."
1. Sun Tzu said: The art of war recognises nine varieties of ground: (1) dispersive ground; (2) facile ground; (3) contentious ground; (4) open ground; (5) ground of intersecting highways; (6) serious ground; (7) difficult ground; (8) hemmed-in ground; (9) desperate ground.
2. When a chieftain fights in his own territory, it is dispersive ground.
Commentary: So called because the soldiers, being near their homes and anxious to see their wives and children, are likely to seize the chance a battle gives them and scatter in every direction. "In advancing," observes Tu Mu, "they will lack the valour of desperation, and in retreating they will find places of refuge."
3. When he has penetrated hostile territory, but not far, it is facile ground.
Commentary: Li Ch'uan and Ho Shih say "because of the ease of retreating", and the other commentators explain it similarly. Tu Mu remarks: "When your army has crossed the border you should burn your boats and bridges, to make it clear to everyone that you have no hankering after home."
4. Ground that gives a great advantage to whichever side holds it is contentious ground.
Commentary: Tu Mu defines it as ground "to be contended for". Ts'ao Kung says: "ground on which the few and the weak can defeat the many and the strong" — such as "the neck of a pass", which is Li Ch'uan's instance. Thermopylae was of this kind, because holding it even for a few days meant checking an entire invading army and so gaining invaluable time. Compare Wu Tzu, chapter 5, at the beginning: "For those who have to fight at odds of one to ten, there is nothing better than a narrow pass." When Lu Kuang was returning from his triumphant expedition to Turkestan in A.D. 385, and had got as far as I-ho laden with spoils, Liang Hsi, administrator of Liang-chou, took advantage of the death of Fu Chien, King of Ch'in, to plot against him and bar his way into the province. Yang Han, governor of Kao-ch'ang, advised him: "Lu Kuang is fresh from his victories in the west, and his soldiers are vigorous and mettlesome. If we oppose him in the shifting sands of the desert we shall be no match for him, so we must try another plan. Let us hurry to occupy the defile at the mouth of the Kao-wu pass, cutting him off from water; then, when his troops are prostrate with thirst, we can dictate our own terms without moving. Or, if you think that pass too far off, we could make a stand against him at the I-wu pass, which is nearer. The cunning and resource of Tzu-fang himself would be spent in vain against the enormous strength of these two positions." Liang Hsi refused to act on the advice, and was overwhelmed and swept away by the invader.
5. Ground on which each side has freedom of movement is open ground.
Commentary: There are various readings of the Chinese adjective for this kind of ground. Ts'ao Kung says it means "ground covered with a network of roads", like a chessboard. Ho Shih suggested "ground on which communication is easy".
6. Ground that forms the key to three neighbouring states,
Commentary: Ts'ao Kung defines this as "our country adjoining the enemy's, and a third country bordering on both". Meng Shih instances the small principality of Cheng, bounded on the north-east by Ch'i, on the west by Chin and on the south by Ch'u.
so that whoever occupies it first has most of the Empire at his command,
Commentary: The belligerent who holds this dominating position can force most of them to become his allies.
is ground of intersecting highways.
7. When an army has penetrated into the heart of a hostile country, leaving a number of fortified cities behind it, it is serious ground.
Commentary: Wang Hsi explains the name by saying that "when an army has reached such a point, its situation is serious".
8. Mountain forests,
Commentary: Or simply "forests".
rugged steeps, marshes and fens — all country that is hard to cross: this is difficult ground.
9. Ground reached through narrow gorges, from which we can only retire by winding paths, so that a small number of the enemy would be enough to crush a large body of our men: this is hemmed-in ground.
10. Ground on which we can be saved from destruction only by fighting without delay is desperate ground.
Commentary: The situation as Ts'ao Kung pictures it is very like hemmed-in ground, except that here escape is no longer possible: "A lofty mountain in front, a large river behind, advance impossible, retreat blocked." Ch'en Hao says: "To be on desperate ground is like sitting in a leaking boat or crouching in a burning house." Tu Mu quotes Li Ching's vivid description of the plight of an army so trapped: "Suppose an army invading hostile territory without the help of local guides: it falls into a fatal snare and is at the enemy's mercy. A ravine on the left, a mountain on the right, a path so perilous that the horses have to be roped together and the chariots carried in slings, no passage open in front, retreat cut off behind, no choice but to go in single file. Then, before there is time to draw our soldiers up in order of battle, the enemy appears on the scene in overwhelming strength. Advancing, we can nowhere take a breathing space; retreating, we have no haven of refuge. We seek a pitched battle in vain; yet standing on the defensive, none of us has a moment's respite. If we simply hold our ground, whole days and months will crawl by; the moment we move, we have to sustain the enemy's attacks front and rear. The country is wild, without water or plants; the army lacks the necessities of life, the horses are jaded and the men worn out, all our resources of strength and skill useless, the pass so narrow that a single man defending it can check the onset of ten thousand; every means of attack in the enemy's hands, every point of vantage already forfeited by us. In this terrible plight, even if we had the most valiant soldiers and the keenest weapons, how could they be used to the slightest effect?" Students of Greek history may be reminded of the awful close of the Sicilian expedition and the agony of the Athenians under Nicias and Demosthenes (see Thucydides, VII. 78 and following).
11. On dispersive ground, therefore, do not fight. On facile ground, do not halt. On contentious ground, do not attack.
Commentary: Rather, let all your energy go into occupying the advantageous position first. So Ts'ao Kung. Li Ch'uan and others, however, suppose the meaning to be that the enemy has already forestalled us, so that it would be sheer madness to attack. In the Sun Tzu Hsu Lu, when the King of Wu asks what should be done in this case, Sun Tzu replies: "The rule about contentious ground is that those in possession have the advantage. If a position of that kind has been secured first by the enemy, beware of attacking him. Lure him away by pretending to flee; show your banners and sound your drums; make a dash for other places he cannot afford to lose; trail brushwood and raise a dust; confound his ears and eyes; detach a body of your best troops and put it secretly in ambush. Then your opponent will sally out to the rescue."
12. On open ground, do not try to block the enemy's way.
Commentary: Because the attempt would be futile and would expose the blocking force itself to serious risk. There are two readings available here. I follow Chang Yu's. The other is indicated in Ts'ao Kung's brief note: "Draw closer together" — that is, see that no part of your own army is cut off.
On ground of intersecting highways, join hands with your allies.
Commentary: Or perhaps, "form alliances with neighbouring states".
13. On serious ground, gather in plunder.
Commentary: Li Ch'uan has this delicious note: "When an army penetrates far into the enemy's country, care must be taken not to alienate the people by unjust treatment. Follow the example of the Han Emperor Kao Tsu, whose march into Ch'in territory was marked by no violation of women and no looting of valuables." (Note well: this was in 207 B.C., and may well make us blush for the Christian armies that entered Peking in A.D. 1900.) "So he won all hearts. In this passage, then, I think the true reading must be not 'plunder' but 'do not plunder'." Alas, I fear that here the worthy commentator's feelings outran his judgment. Tu Mu at least has no such illusions. He says: "When encamped on serious ground, with no inducement as yet to advance further and no possibility of retreat, one ought to prepare for a long resistance by bringing in provisions from all sides, and keep a close watch on the enemy."
On difficult ground, keep steadily on the march.
Commentary: Or, in the words of Chapter Eight, verse 2, "do not encamp".
14. On hemmed-in ground, resort to stratagem.
Commentary: Ts'ao Kung says: "Try the effect of some unusual artifice." Tu Yu amplifies this: "In such a position some scheme must be devised to suit the circumstances, and if we can succeed in deluding the enemy, the danger may be escaped." This is exactly what happened on the famous occasion when Hannibal was hemmed in among the mountains on the road to Casilinum and to all appearances trapped by the dictator Fabius. The stratagem Hannibal devised to baffle his enemies was remarkably like the one T'ien Tan had used with success exactly 62 years earlier (see Chapter Nine, verse 24, note). When night came on, bundles of twigs were fastened to the horns of some 2000 oxen and set alight, and the terrified animals were driven quickly along the mountainside towards the passes the enemy was holding. The strange spectacle of these rapidly moving lights so alarmed and disconcerted the Romans that they withdrew from their position, and Hannibal's army passed safely through the defile. (See Polybius, III. 93, 94; Livy, XXII. 16, 17.)
On desperate ground, fight.
Commentary: For, as Chia Lin remarks: "If you fight with all your might there is a chance of life, whereas death is certain if you cling to your corner."
15. Those who were called skilful leaders of old knew how to drive a wedge between the enemy's front and rear;
Commentary: More literally, "cause the front and rear to lose touch with each other".
to prevent cooperation between his large and small divisions; to stop the good troops rescuing the bad and the officers rallying their men.
16. When the enemy's men were scattered, they prevented them from concentrating; even when their forces were united, they contrived to keep them in disorder.
17. When it was to their advantage, they moved forward; when it was not, they stayed still.
Commentary: Mei Yao-ch'en connects this with what goes before: "Having dislocated the enemy in this way, they would push forward to secure any advantage to be had; if there was none, they stayed where they were."
18. If I am asked how to deal with a great host of the enemy in orderly array and on the point of marching to attack, I should say: "Begin by seizing something your opponent holds dear; then he will be amenable to your will."
Commentary: Opinions differ about what Sun Tzu had in mind. Ts'ao Kung thinks it is "some strategic advantage the enemy is depending on". Tu Mu says: "The three things an enemy is anxious to do, and on which his success depends, are (1) to capture our favourable positions, (2) to ravage our cultivated land, and (3) to guard his own communications." Our object, then, must be to thwart his plans in these three directions and so leave him helpless. (Compare Chapter Three, verse 3.) By boldly seizing the initiative this way, you at once throw the other side on the defensive.
19. Rapidity is the essence of war:
Commentary: According to Tu Mu, "this is a summary of the leading principles in warfare", and he adds: "These are the profoundest truths of military science and the chief business of the general." The following anecdotes, told by Ho Shih, show the importance two of China's greatest generals attached to speed. In A.D. 227 Meng Ta, governor of Hsin-ch'eng under the Wei Emperor Wen Ti, was contemplating defection to the House of Shu and had entered into correspondence with Chu-ko Liang, that State's prime minister. The Wei general Ssu-ma I was then military governor of Wan, and, getting wind of Meng Ta's treachery, he set off at once with an army to forestall the revolt, having first lulled him with a specious message of friendship. Ssu-ma's officers came to him and said: "If Meng Ta has allied himself with Wu and Shu, the matter should be thoroughly investigated before we move." Ssu-ma I replied: "Meng Ta is an unprincipled man, and we ought to go and punish him at once, while he is still wavering and before he has thrown off the mask." Then, by a series of forced marches, he brought his army under the walls of Hsin-ch'eng within eight days. Now Meng Ta had said in an earlier letter to Chu-ko Liang: "Wan is 1200 li from here. When news of my revolt reaches Ssu-ma I, he will at once inform his imperial master, but a whole month will pass before any steps can be taken, and by then my city will be well fortified. Besides, Ssu-ma I is sure not to come himself, and the generals who will be sent against us are not worth troubling about." His next letter was full of consternation: "Though only eight days have passed since I threw off my allegiance, an army is already at the city gates. What miraculous rapidity is this!" A fortnight later Hsin-ch'eng had fallen and Meng Ta had lost his head. (See the Chin Shu, chapter 1, folio 3.) In A.D. 621 Li Ching was sent from K'uei-chou in Ssu-ch'uan to put down the successful rebel Hsiao Hsien, who had set himself up as Emperor at what is now Ching-chou Fu in Hupeh. It was autumn, and the Yangtse being in flood, Hsiao Hsien never dreamed his adversary would venture down through the gorges, and so made no preparations. But Li Ching embarked his army without losing any time, and was just about to start when the other generals begged him to postpone his departure until the river was less dangerous. Li Ching replied: "To the soldier, overwhelming speed is of paramount importance, and he must never miss an opportunity. Now is the time to strike, before Hsiao Hsien even knows we have got an army together. If we seize this moment while the river is in flood, we shall appear before his capital with startling suddenness, like the thunder that is heard before you have time to stop your ears against it (see Chapter Seven, verse 19, note). This is the great principle in war. Even if he learns of our approach, he will have to levy his soldiers in such a hurry that they will be unfit to oppose us. So the full fruits of victory will be ours." Everything came about as he predicted, and Hsiao Hsien had to surrender, nobly stipulating that his people should be spared and he alone suffer death.
take advantage of the enemy's unreadiness, make your way by unexpected routes, and attack unguarded spots.
20. These are the principles an invading force should observe. The further you penetrate into a country, the greater the solidarity of your own troops, and so the defenders will not prevail against you.
21. Make raids in fertile country in order to supply your army with food.
Commentary: Compare above, verse 13. Li Ch'uan does not venture a note here.
22. Study the well-being of your men carefully,
Commentary: By "well-being" Wang Hsi means: "Pet them, humour them, give them plenty of food and drink, and look after them generally."
and do not overtax them. Concentrate your energy and hoard your strength.
Commentary: Ch'en Hao recalls the course adopted in 224 B.C. by the famous general Wang Chien, whose military genius contributed so much to the success of the First Emperor. He had invaded the Ch'u State, where a universal levy was raised against him. But, doubtful of his troops' temper, he refused every invitation to fight and stayed strictly on the defensive. In vain did the Ch'u general try to force a battle: day after day Wang Chien kept inside his walls and would not come out, but gave his whole time and energy to winning his men's affection and confidence. He saw that they were well fed, shared his own meals with them, provided facilities for bathing, and used every method of judicious indulgence to weld them into a loyal and homogeneous body. After some time had passed, he sent certain people to find out how the men were amusing themselves. The answer was that they were competing with one another at putting the weight and long jumping. When Wang Chien heard they were at these athletic pursuits, he knew their spirits had been strung up to the right pitch and that they were ready to fight. By this time the Ch'u army, having repeated its challenge again and again, had marched away eastwards in disgust. The Ch'in general immediately broke camp and followed them, and in the battle that followed they were routed with great slaughter. Shortly afterwards the whole of Ch'u was conquered by Ch'in, and its king Fu-ch'u led into captivity.
Keep your army continually on the move,
Commentary: So that the enemy never knows exactly where you are. It has struck me, however, that the true reading might be "link your army together".
and devise unfathomable plans.
23. Throw your soldiers into positions from which there is no escape, and they will prefer death to flight. Once they will face death, there is nothing they may not achieve.
Commentary: Chang Yu quotes his favourite Wei Liao Tzu, chapter 3: "If one man were to run amok with a sword in the marketplace and everybody else tried to get out of his way, I should not allow that this one man had courage and all the rest were contemptible cowards. The truth is that a desperado and a man who sets some value on his life do not meet on even terms."
Officers and men alike will put out their utmost strength.
Commentary: Chang Yu says: "If they are in an awkward place together, they will surely exert their united strength to get out of it."
24. Soldiers in desperate straits lose their sense of fear. If there is no place of refuge, they will stand firm. If they are in the heart of a hostile country, they will show a stubborn front. If there is no help for it, they will fight hard.
25. So, without waiting to be marshalled, the soldiers will be constantly on the qui vive; without waiting to be asked, they will do your will;
Commentary: Literally, "without asking, you will get".
without restrictions, they will be faithful; without being given orders, they can be trusted.
26. Prohibit the taking of omens, and do away with superstitious doubts. Then, until death itself comes, no calamity need be feared.
Commentary: The superstitious, "bound in to saucy doubts and fears", degenerate into cowards and "die many times before their deaths". Tu Mu quotes Huang Shih-kung: "Spells and incantations should be strictly forbidden, and no officer allowed to inquire by divination into an army's fortunes, for fear the soldiers' minds should be seriously disturbed." "The meaning," he goes on, "is that if all doubts and scruples are discarded, your men will never falter in their resolution until they die."
27. If our soldiers are not overburdened with money, it is not that they dislike riches; if their lives are not unduly long, it is not that they are disinclined to live.
Commentary: Chang Yu has the best note on this passage: "Wealth and long life are things all men naturally incline to. So if they burn or throw away valuables and sacrifice their own lives, it is not that they dislike them, but simply that they have no choice." Sun Tzu is slyly hinting that, since soldiers are only human, it is for the general to see that no temptation to shirk fighting and grow rich is put in their way.
28. On the day they are ordered out to battle, your soldiers may weep,
Commentary: The word in the Chinese is "snivel", which is taken to indicate more genuine grief than tears alone.
those sitting up wetting their clothes and those lying down letting the tears run down their cheeks.
Commentary: Not because they are afraid but because, as Ts'ao Kung says, "all have embraced the firm resolution to do or die". We may remember that the heroes of the Iliad were just as childlike in showing their emotion. Chang Yu alludes to the mournful parting at the I River between Ching K'o and his friends, when Ching K'o was sent to attempt the life of the King of Ch'in (afterwards the First Emperor) in 227 B.C. The tears of all flowed down like rain as he said goodbye and spoke these lines: "The shrill blast is blowing, / Chilly the burn; / Your champion is going — / Not to return."
Footnote: Giles's Biographical Dictionary, no. 399.
But let them once be brought to bay, and they will show the courage of a Chu or a Kuei.
Commentary: Chu was the personal name of Chuan Chu, a native of the Wu State and a contemporary of Sun Tzu himself, who was employed by Kung-tzu Kuang, better known as Ho Lu Wang, to assassinate his sovereign Wang Liao with a dagger hidden in the belly of a fish served up at a banquet. He succeeded, and was immediately hacked to pieces by the king's bodyguard. That was in 515 B.C. The other hero, Ts'ao Kuei (or Ts'ao Mo), performed the exploit that made his name famous 166 years earlier, in 681 B.C. Lu had been defeated three times by Ch'i and was about to conclude a treaty surrendering a large slice of territory, when Ts'ao Kuei suddenly seized Huan Kung, the Duke of Ch'i, as he stood on the altar steps, and held a dagger to his chest. None of the duke's retainers dared move a muscle, and Ts'ao Kuei went on to demand full restitution, declaring that Lu was being unjustly treated because she was a smaller and weaker state. Huan Kung, in peril of his life, had to consent, and Ts'ao Kuei flung the dagger away and quietly resumed his place among the terrified assembly without so much as changing colour. As might be expected, the Duke afterwards wanted to repudiate the bargain; but his wise old counsellor Kuan Chung pointed out how impolitic it would be to break his word, and the upshot was that this bold stroke regained for Lu the whole of what she had lost in three pitched battles.
29. The skilful tactician may be compared to the shuai-jan. Now the shuai-jan is a snake found in the Ch'ang mountains.
Commentary: Shuai-jan means "suddenly" or "rapidly", and the snake was doubtless so called because of the speed of its movements. Through this passage the term has now come to be used in Chinese for "military manoeuvres".
Strike at its head and you will be attacked by its tail; strike at its tail and you will be attacked by its head; strike at its middle and you will be attacked by head and tail together.
30. Asked whether an army can be made to imitate the shuai-jan,
Commentary: That is, as Mei Yao-ch'en says: "Is it possible to make the front and rear of an army each respond swiftly to an attack on the other, just as though they were parts of a single living body?"
I should answer, yes. For the men of Wu and the men of Yueh are enemies;
Commentary: Compare Chapter Six, verse 21.
yet if they are crossing a river in the same boat and are caught by a storm, they will come to each other's help just as the left hand helps the right.
Commentary: The meaning is: if two enemies will help each other in a moment of common peril, how much more should two parts of the same army, bound together as they are by every tie of interest and fellow feeling. And yet it is notorious that many a campaign has been ruined by the lack of cooperation, especially where armies are allied.
31. So it is not enough to put your trust in tethering the horses and burying the chariot wheels in the ground.
Commentary: These quaint devices for stopping an army running away recall the Athenian hero Sophanes, who carried an anchor with him at the battle of Plataea and used it to fasten himself firmly to one spot (see Herodotus, IX. 74). It is not enough, says Sun Tzu, to make flight impossible by such mechanical means. You will not succeed unless your men have tenacity and unity of purpose and, above all, a spirit of sympathetic cooperation. That is the lesson to be learned from the shuai-jan.
32. The principle for managing an army is to set up one standard of courage that all must reach.
Commentary: Literally, "level the courage of all as though it were that of one". If the ideal army is to form a single organic whole, then the resolution and spirit of its parts must be of the same quality, or at least must not fall below a certain standard. Wellington's seemingly ungrateful description of his army at Waterloo as "the worst he had ever commanded" meant no more than that it was deficient in this important particular — unity of spirit and courage. Had he not foreseen the Belgian defections and carefully kept those troops in the background, he would almost certainly have lost the day.
33. How to make the best of both the strong and the weak — that is a question of the proper use of ground.
Commentary: Mei Yao-ch'en's paraphrase is: "The way to eliminate the differences between strong and weak, and make both serviceable, is to use the accidental features of the ground." Less reliable troops, posted in strong positions, will hold out as long as better troops on more exposed ground. The advantage of position cancels out the inferiority in stamina and courage. Colonel Henderson says: "With all respect to the textbooks, and to the ordinary tactical teaching, I am inclined to think that the study of ground is often overlooked, and that by no means sufficient importance is attached to the selection of positions… and to the immense advantages to be derived, whether you are defending or attacking, from the proper use of natural features."
Footnote: "The Science of War," p. 333.
34. So the skilful general leads his army just as though he were leading a single man by the hand, willing or not.
Commentary: Tu Mu says: "The simile refers to the ease with which he does it."
35. It is the business of a general to be quiet, and so ensure secrecy; upright and just, and so maintain order.
36. He must be able to mystify his officers and men with false reports and appearances,
Commentary: Literally, "to deceive their eyes and ears".
and so keep them in total ignorance.
Commentary: Ts'ao Kung gives us one of his excellent maxims: "The troops must not be allowed to share your schemes at the beginning; they may only rejoice with you over the happy outcome." To mystify, mislead and surprise the enemy is one of the first principles of war, as has often been pointed out. But what of the other process — mystifying one's own men? Anyone who thinks Sun Tzu over-emphatic on this point would do well to read Colonel Henderson's remarks on Stonewall Jackson's Valley campaign: "The infinite pains," he says, "with which Jackson sought to conceal, even from his most trusted staff officers, his movements, his intentions and his thoughts, a commander less thorough would have pronounced useless" — and so on. In A.D. 88, as we read in chapter 47 of the Hou Han Shu, Pan Ch'ao took the field with 25,000 men from Khotan and other Central Asian states, meaning to crush Yarkand. The King of Kutcha answered by sending his chief commander to relieve the place with an army drawn from the kingdoms of Wen-su, Ku-mo and Wei-t'ou, 50,000 men in all. Pan Ch'ao summoned his officers, and the King of Khotan too, to a council of war, and said: "Our forces are now outnumbered and unable to make head against the enemy. The best plan is for us to separate and disperse, each in a different direction. The King of Khotan will march away by the easterly route, and I will return westward. Let us wait until the evening drum has sounded, and then start." Pan Ch'ao now secretly released the prisoners he had taken alive, and so the King of Kutcha learned his plans. Much elated by the news, the King set off at once at the head of 10,000 horsemen to bar Pan Ch'ao's retreat in the west, while the King of Wen-su rode east with 8000 horse to intercept the King of Khotan. As soon as Pan Ch'ao knew the two chieftains had gone, he called his divisions together, got them well in hand, and at cockcrow hurled them against the army of Yarkand as it lay encamped. Panic-stricken, it fled in confusion, closely pursued by Pan Ch'ao. Over 5000 heads were brought back as trophies, besides immense spoils in horses and cattle and valuables of every kind. Yarkand then capitulated, and Kutcha and the other kingdoms drew off their forces. From that time on Pan Ch'ao's prestige completely overawed the countries of the west. Here, as we see, the Chinese general not only kept his own officers in ignorance of his real plans but actually took the bold step of dividing his army in order to deceive the enemy.
Footnote: "Stonewall Jackson," vol. I, p. 421.
37. By altering his arrangements and changing his plans,
Commentary: Wang Hsi thinks this means not using the same stratagem twice.
he keeps the enemy without definite knowledge.
Commentary: Chang Yu, quoting another work, says: "The axiom that war is based on deception does not apply only to deceiving the enemy. You must deceive your own soldiers too. Make them follow you, but without letting them know why."
By shifting his camp and taking roundabout routes, he prevents the enemy from anticipating his purpose.
38. At the critical moment, the leader of an army acts like a man who has climbed up to a height and then kicks the ladder away behind him. He carries his men deep into hostile territory before he shows his hand.
Commentary: Literally, "releases the spring" (see Chapter Five, verse 15) — that is, he takes some decisive step that makes it impossible for the army to return, like Hsiang Yu, who sank his ships after crossing a river. Ch'en Hao, followed by Chia Lin, understands the words less well as "puts forth every artifice at his command".
39. He burns his boats and breaks his cooking pots; like a shepherd driving a flock of sheep, he drives his men this way and that, and none of them knows where he is going.
Commentary: Tu Mu says: "The army knows only the orders to advance or retreat; it is ignorant of the ultimate ends of attacking and conquering."
40. To muster his host and bring it into danger — this may be called the business of the general.
Commentary: Sun Tzu means that after mobilisation there should be no delay in aiming a blow at the enemy's heart. Note how he returns to this point again and again. Among the warring states of ancient China, desertion was no doubt a much more present fear and a more serious evil than it is in the armies of today.
41. The different measures suited to the nine varieties of ground;
Commentary: Chang Yu says: "One must not be hidebound in interpreting the rules for the nine varieties of ground."
the expediency of aggressive or defensive tactics; and the fundamental laws of human nature: these are things that must most certainly be studied.
42. When invading hostile territory, the general principle is that penetrating deeply brings cohesion, while penetrating only a short way means dispersion.
Commentary: Compare above, verse 20.
43. When you leave your own country behind and take your army across neighbouring territory, you find yourself on critical ground.
Commentary: This "ground" is curiously mentioned in Chapter Eight, verse 2, but it does not figure among the Nine Situations, nor among the Six Calamities in Chapter Ten. One's first impulse would be to translate it "distant ground", but that, if we can trust the commentators, is precisely what is not meant here. Mei Yao-ch'en says it is "a position not far enough advanced to be called 'facile', and not near enough to home to be 'dispersive', but something between the two". Wang Hsi says: "It is ground separated from home by an intervening state, whose territory we have had to cross in order to reach it. Hence it is incumbent on us to settle our business there quickly." He adds that this position occurs rarely, which is why it is not included among the Nine Situations.
When there are means of communication on all four sides, the ground is one of intersecting highways.
44. When you penetrate deeply into a country, it is serious ground. When you penetrate only a little way, it is facile ground.
45. When you have the enemy's strongholds on your rear and narrow passes in front, it is hemmed-in ground. When there is no place of refuge at all, it is desperate ground.
46. Therefore, on dispersive ground, I would inspire my men with unity of purpose.
Commentary: This end, according to Tu Mu, is best attained by remaining on the defensive and avoiding battle. Compare above, verse 11.
On facile ground, I would see that there is close connection between all parts of my army.
Commentary: As Tu Mu says, the object is to guard against two possible contingencies: "(1) the desertion of our own troops; (2) a sudden attack on the part of the enemy." Compare Chapter Seven, verse 17. Mei Yao-ch'en says: "On the march, the regiments should be in close touch; in an encampment, there should be continuity between the fortifications."
47. On contentious ground, I would hurry up my rear.
Commentary: This is Ts'ao Kung's interpretation. Chang Yu adopts it, saying: "We must quickly bring up our rear, so that head and tail may both reach the goal" — that is, they must not be allowed to straggle up a long way apart. Mei Yao-ch'en offers another equally plausible explanation: "Supposing the enemy has not yet reached the coveted position, and we are behind him, we should advance with all speed in order to dispute its possession." Ch'en Hao, on the other hand, assuming that the enemy has had time to select his own ground, quotes Chapter Six, verse 1, where Sun Tzu warns us against coming exhausted to the attack. His own idea of the situation is rather vaguely expressed: "If there is a favourable position lying in front of you, detach a picked body of troops to occupy it; then, if the enemy relies on his numbers and comes up to make a fight for it, you may fall quickly on his rear with your main body, and victory will be assured." It was in this way, he adds, that Chao She beat the army of Ch'in. (See Chapter Seven, verse 4, note.)
48. On open ground, I would keep a vigilant eye on my defences. On ground of intersecting highways, I would consolidate my alliances.
49. On serious ground, I would try to ensure a continuous stream of supplies.
Commentary: The commentators take this as referring to forage and plunder, not, as one might expect, to an unbroken line of communication with a home base.
On difficult ground, I would keep pushing on along the road.
50. On hemmed-in ground, I would block any way of retreat.
Commentary: Meng Shih says: "To make it seem that I meant to defend the position, whereas my real intention is to burst suddenly through the enemy's lines." Mei Yao-ch'en says: "in order to make my soldiers fight with desperation". Wang Hsi says: "fearing that my men may be tempted to run away". Tu Mu points out that this is the converse of Chapter Seven, verse 36, where it is the enemy who is surrounded. In A.D. 532 Kao Huan, afterwards Emperor and canonised as Shen-wu, was surrounded by a great army under Erh-chu Chao and others. His own force was comparatively small, consisting only of 2000 horse and something under 30,000 foot. The lines of investment had not been drawn very closely together, gaps being left at certain points. But Kao Huan, instead of trying to escape, actually contrived to block all the remaining outlets himself, by driving into them a number of oxen and donkeys roped together. As soon as his officers and men saw that there was nothing for it but to conquer or die, their spirits rose to an extraordinary pitch of exaltation, and they charged with such desperate ferocity that the opposing ranks broke and crumbled under their onslaught.
On desperate ground, I would proclaim to my soldiers the hopelessness of saving their lives.
Commentary: Tu Yu says: "Burn your baggage and impedimenta, throw away your stores and provisions, choke up the wells, destroy your cooking-stoves, and make it plain to your men that they cannot survive, but must fight to the death." Mei Yao-ch'en says: "The only chance of life lies in giving up all hope of it." This concludes what Sun Tzu has to say about "grounds" and the "variations" corresponding to them. Reviewing the passages that bear on this important subject, we cannot fail to be struck by the desultory and unmethodical way in which it is treated. Sun Tzu begins abruptly in Chapter Eight, verse 2, to enumerate "variations" before touching on "grounds" at all, but mentions only five, namely nos. 7, 5, 8 and 9 of the later list, and one that is not included in it. A few varieties of ground are dealt with in the earlier part of Chapter Nine, and then Chapter Ten sets out six new grounds, with six variations of plan to match. None of these is mentioned again, though the first is hardly to be distinguished from ground no. 4 in the next chapter. At last, in Chapter Eleven, we come to the Nine Grounds proper, immediately followed by the variations. This takes us down to verse 14. In verses 43 to 45, fresh definitions are provided for nos. 5, 6, 2, 8 and 9 (in that order), as well as for the tenth ground noticed in Chapter Eight; and finally the nine variations are enumerated once more from beginning to end, all of them, except 5, 6 and 7, different from those given before. Though it is impossible to account for the present state of Sun Tzu's text, a few suggestive facts may be brought into prominence: (1) Chapter Eight, according to its title, should deal with nine variations, whereas only five appear. (2) It is an abnormally short chapter. (3) Chapter Eleven is entitled The Nine Grounds. Several of these are defined twice over, and besides that there are two distinct lists of the corresponding variations. (4) The length of the chapter is disproportionate, being double that of any other except Nine. I do not propose to draw any inferences from these facts, beyond the general conclusion that Sun Tzu's work cannot have come down to us in the shape in which it left his hands: Chapter Eight is obviously defective and probably out of place, while Eleven seems to contain matter that has either been added by a later hand or ought to appear elsewhere.
51. For it is the soldier's disposition to offer an obstinate resistance when surrounded, to fight hard when he cannot help himself, and to obey promptly when he has fallen into danger.
Commentary: Chang Yu alludes to the conduct of Pan Ch'ao's devoted followers in A.D. 73. The story runs like this in the Hou Han Shu, chapter 47: "When Pan Ch'ao arrived at Shan-shan, Kuang, the King of the country, received him at first with great politeness and respect; but shortly afterwards his behaviour underwent a sudden change, and he became remiss and negligent. Pan Ch'ao spoke about this to the officers of his suite. 'Have you noticed,' he said, 'that Kuang's polite intentions are on the wane? This must mean that envoys have come from the Northern barbarians, and that he is consequently in a state of indecision, not knowing which side to throw in his lot with. That is surely the reason. The truly wise man, we are told, can perceive things before they have come to pass; how much more, then, those that are already plain!' Then he called in one of the natives who had been assigned to his service, and set a trap for him, saying: 'Where are those envoys from the Hsiung-nu who arrived some days ago?' The man was so taken aback that between surprise and fear he blurted out the whole truth on the spot. Pan Ch'ao, keeping his informant carefully under lock and key, then summoned a general gathering of his officers, thirty-six in all, and began drinking with them. When the wine had gone a little to their heads, he tried to rouse their spirit still further by addressing them like this: 'Gentlemen, here we are in the heart of an isolated region, anxious to win riches and honour by some great exploit. Now it happens that an ambassador from the Hsiung-nu arrived in this kingdom only a few days ago, and the result is that the respectful courtesy our royal host extended to us has disappeared. If this envoy should prevail on him to seize our party and hand us over to the Hsiung-nu, our bones will become food for the wolves of the desert. What are we to do?' With one accord the officers replied: 'Standing as we do in peril of our lives, we will follow our commander through life and death.'" For the sequel of this adventure, see Chapter Twelve, verse 1, note.
52. We cannot enter into alliance with neighbouring princes until we are acquainted with their designs. We are not fit to lead an army on the march unless we are familiar with the face of the country — its mountains and forests, its pitfalls and precipices, its marshes and swamps. We shall be unable to turn natural advantages to account unless we make use of local guides.
Commentary: These three sentences are repeated from Chapter Seven, verses 12 to 14 — in order to emphasise their importance, the commentators seem to think. I prefer to regard them as interpolated here in order to form an antecedent to the words that follow. With regard to local guides, Sun Tzu might have added that there is always the risk of going wrong, either through their treachery or through some misunderstanding such as Livy records (XXII. 13): Hannibal, we are told, ordered a guide to lead him into the neighbourhood of Casinum, where there was an important pass to be occupied; but his Carthaginian accent, unsuited to the pronunciation of Latin names, made the guide understand Casilinum instead of Casinum, and turning off his proper route he took the army in that direction, the mistake not being discovered until they had almost arrived.
53. To be ignorant of any one of the following four or five principles does not befit a warlike prince.
54. When a warlike prince attacks a powerful state, his generalship shows itself in preventing the concentration of the enemy's forces. He overawes his opponents, and their allies are prevented from joining against him.
Commentary: Mei Tao-ch'en constructs one of those chains of reasoning the Chinese are so fond of: "In attacking a powerful state, if you can divide her forces you will have a superiority in strength; if you have a superiority in strength you will overawe the enemy; if you overawe the enemy, the neighbouring states will be frightened; and if the neighbouring states are frightened, the enemy's allies will be prevented from joining her." The following gives a stronger meaning: "If the great state has once been defeated (before she has had time to summon her allies), then the lesser states will hold aloof and refrain from massing their forces." Ch'en Hao and Chang Yu take the sentence in quite another way. The former says: "Powerful though a prince may be, if he attacks a large state he will be unable to raise enough troops, and must rely to some extent on outside aid; if he dispenses with this, and with overweening confidence in his own strength simply tries to intimidate the enemy, he will surely be defeated." Chang Yu puts his view like this: "If we recklessly attack a large state, our own people will be discontented and hang back. But if (as will then be the case) our display of military force is inferior by half to the enemy's, the other chieftains will take fright and refuse to join us."
55. Hence he does not strive to ally himself with all and sundry, nor does he foster the power of other states. He carries out his own secret designs, keeping his antagonists in awe.
Commentary: The train of thought, as Li Ch'uan puts it, appears to be this: secure against a combination of his enemies, "he can afford to reject entangling alliances and simply pursue his own secret designs, his prestige enabling him to dispense with outside friendships".
So he is able to capture their cities and overthrow their kingdoms.
Commentary: This paragraph, though written many years before the Ch'in State became a serious menace, is not a bad summary of the policy by which the famous Six Chancellors gradually paved the way for her final triumph under Shih Huang Ti. Chang Yu, following up his earlier note, thinks that Sun Tzu is condemning this attitude of cold-blooded selfishness and haughty isolation.
56. Bestow rewards without regard to rule,
Commentary: Wu Tzu (chapter 3) says, less wisely: "Let advance be richly rewarded and retreat be heavily punished."
issue orders
Commentary: Literally, "hang" or "post up".
without regard to previous arrangements;
Commentary: "In order to prevent treachery," says Wang Hsi. The general meaning is made clear by Ts'ao Kung's quotation from the Ssu-ma Fa: "Give instructions only on sighting the enemy; give rewards when you see deserving deeds." Ts'ao Kung's own paraphrase: "The final instructions you give your army should not correspond with those that have been posted up beforehand." Chang Yu simplifies this into "your arrangements should not be divulged beforehand", and Chia Lin says: "there should be no fixity in your rules and arrangements". Not only is there danger in letting your plans be known, but war often makes it necessary to reverse them entirely at the last moment.
and you will be able to handle a whole army as though you had to do with only a single man.
Commentary: Compare above, verse 34.
57. Confront your soldiers with the deed itself; never let them know your design.
Commentary: Literally, "do not tell them words" — that is, do not give your reasons for any order. Lord Mansfield once told a junior colleague to "give no reasons" for his decisions, and the maxim applies even more to a general than to a judge.
When the outlook is bright, bring it before their eyes; but tell them nothing when the situation is gloomy.
58. Place your army in deadly peril and it will survive; plunge it into desperate straits and it will come off in safety.
Commentary: These words of Sun Tzu were once quoted by Han Hsin to explain the tactics he used in one of his most brilliant battles. In 204 B.C. he was sent against the army of Chao, and halted ten miles from the mouth of the Ching-hsing pass, where the enemy had mustered in full force. There, at midnight, he detached a body of 2000 light cavalry, every man of them furnished with a red flag. Their instructions were to make their way through the narrow defiles and keep a secret watch on the enemy. "When the men of Chao see me in full flight," Han Hsin said, "they will abandon their fortifications and give chase. That must be the signal for you to rush in, pull down the Chao standards and set up the red banners of Han in their place." Turning then to his other officers, he remarked: "Our adversary holds a strong position and is not likely to come out and attack us until he sees the standard and drums of the commander-in-chief, for fear I should turn back and escape through the mountains." So saying, he first of all sent out a division of 10,000 men and ordered them to form in line of battle with their backs to the River Ti. Seeing this manoeuvre, the whole army of Chao broke into loud laughter. By this time it was broad daylight, and Han Hsin, displaying the generalissimo's flag, marched out of the pass with drums beating and was immediately engaged by the enemy. A great battle followed, lasting some time, until at length Han Hsin and his colleague Chang Ni left drums and banner on the field and fled to the division on the river bank, where another fierce battle was raging. The enemy rushed out to pursue them and to secure the trophies, stripping their ramparts of men; but the two generals succeeded in joining the other army, which was fighting with the utmost desperation. The time had now come for the 2000 horsemen to play their part. As soon as they saw the men of Chao following up their advantage, they galloped behind the deserted walls, tore up the enemy's flags and replaced them with those of Han. When the Chao army looked back from the pursuit, the sight of these red flags struck them with terror. Convinced that the Hans had got in and overpowered their king, they broke up in wild disorder, every effort of their leader to stay the panic being in vain. Then the Han army fell on them from both sides and completed the rout, killing a number and capturing the rest, among whom was King Ya himself… After the battle, some of Han Hsin's officers came to him and said: "In the Art of War we are told to have a hill or a mound on the right rear, and a river or marsh on the left front. [This appears to be a blend of Sun Tzu and T'ai Kung. See Chapter Nine, verse 9, and note.] You, on the contrary, ordered us to draw up our troops with the river at our backs. Under these conditions, how did you manage to gain the victory?" The general replied: "I fear you gentlemen have not studied the Art of War with sufficient care. Is it not written there: 'Plunge your army into desperate straits and it will come off in safety; place it in deadly peril and it will survive'? Had I taken the usual course, I should never have been able to bring my colleague round. What does the Military Classic say? 'Swoop down on the marketplace and drive the men off to fight.' [This passage does not occur in the present text of Sun Tzu.] If I had not placed my troops in a position where they were obliged to fight for their lives, but had allowed each man to follow his own discretion, there would have been a general stampede, and it would have been impossible to do anything with them." The officers admitted the force of his argument, and said: "These are higher tactics than we should have been capable of." (See the Ch'ien Han Shu, chapter 34, folios 4, 5.)
59. For it is precisely when a force has fallen into harm's way that it is capable of striking a blow for victory.
Commentary: Danger has a bracing effect.
60. Success in warfare is gained by carefully accommodating ourselves to the enemy's purpose.
Commentary: Ts'ao Kung says: "Feign stupidity" — by an appearance of yielding and falling in with the enemy's wishes. Chang Yu's note makes the meaning clear: "If the enemy shows an inclination to advance, lure him on to do so; if he is anxious to retreat, delay on purpose so that he may carry out his intention." The object is to make him careless and contemptuous before we deliver our attack.
61. By persistently hanging on the enemy's flank,
Commentary: I understand the first four words to mean "accompanying the enemy in one direction". Ts'ao Kung says: "unite the soldiers and make for the enemy". But such a violent displacement of characters is quite indefensible.
we shall succeed in the long run
Commentary: Literally, "after a thousand li".
in killing the commander-in-chief.
Commentary: Always a great point with the Chinese.
62. This is called the ability to accomplish a thing by sheer cunning.
63. On the day you take up your command, block the frontier passes, destroy the official tallies,
Commentary: These were tablets of bamboo or wood, one half of which was issued as a permit or passport by the official in charge of a gate. Compare the "border warden" of the Lun Yu, III. 24, who may have had similar duties. When this half was returned to him within a fixed period, he was authorised to open the gate and let the traveller through.
and stop the passage of all emissaries.
Commentary: Either to or from the enemy's country.
64. Be stern in the council chamber,
Commentary: Show no weakness, and insist on your plans being ratified by the sovereign.
so that you may control the situation.
Commentary: Mei Yao-ch'en understands the whole sentence to mean: take the strictest precautions to ensure secrecy in your deliberations.
65. If the enemy leaves a door open, you must rush in.
66. Forestall your opponent by seizing what he holds dear,
Commentary: Compare above, verse 18.
and subtly contrive to time his arrival on the ground.
Commentary: Ch'en Hao's explanation: "If I manage to seize a favourable position but the enemy does not appear on the scene, the advantage I have gained cannot be turned to any practical account. Anyone who intends to occupy a position of importance to the enemy must therefore begin by making an artful appointment, so to speak, with his antagonist, and coax him into going there as well." Mei Yao-ch'en explains that this "artful appointment" is to be made through the enemy's own spies, who will carry back just the amount of information we choose to give them. Then, having cunningly disclosed our intentions, "we must manage, though starting after the enemy, to arrive before him (Chapter Seven, verse 4). We must start after him in order to make sure he marches there; we must arrive before him in order to capture the place without trouble." Taken this way, the present passage lends some support to Mei Yao-ch'en's interpretation of verse 47.
67. Walk in the path defined by rule,
Commentary: Chia Lin says: "Victory is the only thing that matters, and this cannot be achieved by adhering to conventional canons." It is unfortunate that this variant rests on very slight authority, for the sense it yields is certainly much more satisfactory. Napoleon, as we know, won his battles — according to the veterans of the old school whom he defeated — by violating every accepted canon of warfare.
and accommodate yourself to the enemy until you can fight a decisive battle.
Commentary: Tu Mu says: "Conform to the enemy's tactics until a favourable opportunity offers; then come forth and engage in a battle that shall prove decisive."
68. At first, then, exhibit the coyness of a maiden, until the enemy gives you an opening; afterwards emulate the rapidity of a running hare, and it will be too late for the enemy to oppose you.
Commentary: As the hare is noted for its extreme timidity, the comparison hardly seems a happy one. But of course Sun Tzu was thinking only of its speed. The words have been taken to mean: you must flee from the enemy as quickly as an escaping hare; but Tu Mu rightly rejects this.
Commentary: Rather more than half the chapter (verses 1 to 13) is devoted to the subject of fire, after which the author branches off into other topics.
1. Sun Tzu said: There are five ways of attacking with fire. The first is to burn soldiers in their camp;
Commentary: So Tu Mu. Li Ch'uan says: "Set fire to the camp, and kill the soldiers" — as they try to escape from the flames. Pan Ch'ao, sent on a diplomatic mission to the King of Shan-shan (see Chapter Eleven, verse 51, note), found himself in extreme peril when an envoy from the Hsiung-nu (the mortal enemies of the Chinese) unexpectedly arrived. Consulting his officers, he exclaimed: "Never venture, never win! The only course open to us now is to make an assault by fire on the barbarians under cover of night, when they will not be able to make out our numbers. Profiting by their panic, we shall wipe them out completely; that will cool the King's courage and cover us with glory, besides ensuring the success of our mission." The officers all replied that the matter would have to be discussed with the Intendant first. Pan Ch'ao then fell into a passion. "It is today," he cried, "that our fortunes must be decided! The Intendant is only a humdrum civilian, who on hearing of our project will certainly take fright, and everything will come to light. An inglorious death is no fitting end for valiant warriors." All then agreed to do as he wished. Accordingly, as soon as night came on, he and his little band made their way quickly to the barbarian camp. A strong gale was blowing at the time. Pan Ch'ao ordered ten of the party to take drums and hide behind the enemy's barracks, arranging that when they saw flames shoot up they should begin drumming and yelling with all their might. The rest of his men, armed with bows and crossbows, he posted in ambush at the gate of the camp. He then set fire to the place from the windward side, and a deafening noise of drums and shouting arose at the front and rear of the Hsiung-nu, who rushed out pell-mell in frantic disorder. Pan Ch'ao killed three of them with his own hand, while his companions cut off the heads of the envoy and thirty of his suite. The remainder, more than a hundred in all, perished in the flames. The following day Pan Ch'ao, divining Kuo Hsun's thoughts, said with uplifted hand: "Although you did not go with us last night, I should not think, sir, of taking sole credit for our exploit." This satisfied Kuo Hsun; and Pan Ch'ao, having sent for Kuang, King of Shan-shan, showed him the head of the barbarian envoy. The whole kingdom was seized with fear and trembling, which Pan Ch'ao took steps to allay by issuing a public proclamation. Then, taking the king's sons as hostages, he returned to make his report to Tou Ku. (Hou Han Shu, chapter 47, folios 1, 2.)
Footnote: "Unless you enter the tiger's lair, you cannot get hold of the tiger's cubs."
the second is to burn stores;
Commentary: Tu Mu says: "Provisions, fuel and fodder." In order to subdue the rebellious population of Kiangnan, Kao Keng recommended Wen Ti of the Sui dynasty to make periodical raids and burn their stores of grain — a policy that in the long run proved entirely successful.
the third is to burn baggage trains;
Commentary: An example given is the destruction of Yuan Shao's wagons and impedimenta by Ts'ao Ts'ao in A.D. 200.
the fourth is to burn arsenals and magazines;
Commentary: Tu Mu says that the things kept in "arsenals" and in "magazines" are the same. He specifies weapons and other implements, bullion and clothing. Compare Chapter Seven, verse 11.
the fifth is to hurl dropping fire among the enemy.
Commentary: Tu Yu says in the T'ung Tien: "To drop fire into the enemy's camp. The method is to set the tips of arrows alight by dipping them into a brazier, and then shoot them from powerful crossbows into the enemy's lines."
2. In order to carry out an attack, we must have means available.
Commentary: Ts'ao Kung thinks that "traitors in the enemy's camp" are meant. But Ch'en Hao is more likely to be right in saying: "We must have favourable circumstances in general, not merely traitors to help us." Chia Lin says: "We must make use of wind and dry weather."
The material for raising fire should always be kept in readiness.
Commentary: Tu Mu suggests as material for making fire "dry vegetable matter, reeds, brushwood, straw, grease, oil and so on". Here we have the material cause. Chang Yu says: "vessels for hoarding fire, stuff for lighting fires".
3. There is a proper season for making attacks with fire, and special days for starting a blaze.
4. The proper season is when the weather is very dry; the special days are those when the moon is in the constellations of the Sieve, the Wall, the Wing or the Cross-bar;
Commentary: These are, respectively, the 7th, 14th, 27th and 28th of the Twenty-eight Stellar Mansions, corresponding roughly to Sagittarius, Pegasus, Crater and Corvus.
for these four are all days of rising wind.
5. In attacking with fire, one should be prepared to meet five possible developments:
6. (1) When fire breaks out inside the enemy's camp, respond at once with an attack from outside.
7. (2) If there is an outbreak of fire but the enemy's soldiers remain quiet, bide your time and do not attack.
Commentary: The chief object of attacking with fire is to throw the enemy into confusion. If that effect is not produced, it means the enemy is ready to receive us — hence the need for caution.
8. (3) When the force of the flames has reached its height, follow it up with an attack if that is practicable; if not, stay where you are.
Commentary: Ts'ao Kung says: "If you see a possible way, advance; but if you find the difficulties too great, retire."
9. (4) If it is possible to make an assault with fire from outside, do not wait for it to break out within, but deliver your attack at a favourable moment.
Commentary: Tu Mu says that the previous paragraphs referred to fire breaking out inside the enemy's camp — either accidentally, we may suppose, or through the work of incendiaries. "But," he goes on, "if the enemy is settled in a waste place littered with quantities of grass, or if he has pitched his camp in a position that can be burnt out, we must carry our fire against him at any suitable opportunity, and not wait in hopes of an outbreak occurring within, for fear our opponents should themselves burn up the surrounding vegetation and so make our own attempts fruitless." The famous Li Ling once baffled the leader of the Hsiung-nu in this way. The latter, taking advantage of a favourable wind, tried to set fire to the Chinese general's camp, but found that every scrap of combustible vegetation in the neighbourhood had already been burnt down. On the other hand, Po-ts'ai, a general of the Yellow Turban rebels, was badly defeated in A.D. 184 through neglecting this simple precaution. "At the head of a large army he was besieging Ch'ang-she, which was held by Huang-fu Sung. The garrison was very small, and a general feeling of nervousness pervaded the ranks; so Huang-fu Sung called his officers together and said: 'In war there are various indirect methods of attack, and numbers do not count for everything.' [The commentator here quotes Sun Tzu, Chapter Five, verses 5, 6 and 10.] 'Now the rebels have pitched their camp in the midst of thick grass, which will burn easily when the wind blows. If we set fire to it at night, they will be thrown into a panic, and we can make a sortie and attack them on all sides at once, matching the achievement of T'ien Tan.' (See Chapter Nine, verse 24, note.) That same evening a strong breeze sprang up, so Huang-fu Sung instructed his soldiers to bind reeds together into torches and mount guard on the city walls, after which he sent out a band of daring men, who stealthily made their way through the lines and started the fire with loud shouts and yells. At the same moment a glare of light shot up from the city walls, and Huang-fu Sung, sounding his drums, led a rapid charge that threw the rebels into confusion and put them to headlong flight." (Hou Han Shu, chapter 71.)
10. (5) When you start a fire, be to windward of it. Do not attack from the leeward.
Commentary: Chang Yu, following Tu Yu, says: "When you make a fire, the enemy will retreat away from it; if you oppose his retreat and attack him then, he will fight desperately, which will not help you to succeed." A rather more obvious explanation is given by Tu Mu: "If the wind is in the east, begin burning to the east of the enemy, and follow up the attack yourself from that side. If you start the fire on the east side and then attack from the west, you will suffer in the same way as your enemy."
11. A wind that rises in the daytime lasts long, but a night breeze soon falls.
Commentary: Compare Lao Tzu's saying: "A violent wind does not last the space of a morning." (Tao Te Ching, chapter 23.) Mei Yao-ch'en and Wang Hsi say: "A day breeze dies down at nightfall, and a night breeze at daybreak. This is what happens as a general rule." The phenomenon observed may be correct enough, but how this sense is to be got out of the words is not apparent.
12. In every army, the five developments connected with fire must be known, the movements of the stars calculated, and a watch kept for the proper days.
Commentary: Tu Mu says: "We must make calculations about the paths of the stars, and watch for the days on which wind will rise, before making our attack with fire." Chang Yu seems to interpret the text differently: "We must not only know how to assail our opponents with fire, but also be on our guard against similar attacks from them."
13. Hence those who use fire as an aid to the attack show intelligence; those who use water as an aid to the attack gain an accession of strength.
14. By means of water an enemy may be intercepted, but not robbed of all his belongings.
Commentary: Ts'ao Kung's note is: "We can merely obstruct the enemy's road or divide his army, but not sweep away all his accumulated stores." Water can do useful service, but it lacks the terrible destructive power of fire. That, Chang Yu concludes, is why the one is dismissed in a couple of sentences while the attack by fire is discussed in detail. Wu Tzu (chapter 4) speaks of the two elements like this: "If an army is encamped on low-lying marshy ground from which the water cannot run off, and where the rainfall is heavy, it may be submerged by a flood. If an army is encamped in wild marshland thickly overgrown with weeds and brambles, and visited by frequent gales, it may be wiped out by fire."
15. Unhappy is the fate of the man who tries to win his battles and succeed in his attacks without cultivating the spirit of enterprise; for the result is waste of time and general stagnation.
Commentary: This is one of the most perplexing passages in Sun Tzu. Ts'ao Kung says: "Rewards for good service should not be deferred a single day." And Tu Mu: "If you do not take the opportunity to advance and reward the deserving, your subordinates will not carry out your commands, and disaster will follow." For several reasons, however, and in spite of the formidable array of scholars on the other side, I prefer the interpretation suggested by Mei Yao-ch'en alone, whose words I will quote: "Those who want to make sure of succeeding in their battles and assaults must seize the favourable moments when they come, and not shrink on occasion from heroic measures — that is to say, they must resort to such means of attack as fire, water and the like. What they must not do, and what will prove fatal, is to sit still and simply hold on to the advantages they have got."
16. Hence the saying: The enlightened ruler lays his plans well ahead; the good general cultivates his resources.
Commentary: Tu Mu quotes the following from the San Lueh, chapter 2: "The warlike prince controls his soldiers by his authority, knits them together by good faith, and by rewards makes them serviceable. If faith decays, there will be disruption; if rewards are deficient, commands will not be respected."
17. Do not move unless you see an advantage; do not use your troops unless there is something to be gained; do not fight unless the position is critical.
Commentary: Sun Tzu may at times appear to be over-cautious, but he never goes as far in that direction as the remarkable passage in the Tao Te Ching, chapter 69: "I dare not take the initiative, but prefer to act on the defensive; I dare not advance an inch, but prefer to retreat a foot."
18. No ruler should put troops into the field merely to gratify his own spleen; no general should fight a battle simply out of pique.
19. If it is to your advantage, make a forward move; if not, stay where you are.
Commentary: This is repeated from Chapter Eleven, verse 17. Here I feel convinced that it is an interpolation, for it is plain that verse 20 ought to follow immediately on verse 18.
20. Anger may in time change to gladness; vexation may be succeeded by content.
21. But a kingdom that has once been destroyed can never come into being again;
Commentary: The Wu State was destined to be a melancholy example of this saying.
nor can the dead ever be brought back to life.
22. Hence the enlightened ruler is heedful, and the good general full of caution. This is the way to keep a country at peace and an army intact.
1. Sun Tzu said: Raising a host of a hundred thousand men and marching them great distances entails heavy loss on the people and a drain on the resources of the State. The daily expenditure will amount to a thousand ounces of silver.
Commentary: Compare Chapter Two, verses 1, 13 and 14.
There will be commotion at home and abroad, and men will drop down exhausted on the highways.
Commentary: Compare the Tao Te Ching, chapter 30: "Where troops have been quartered, brambles and thorns spring up." Chang Yu has this note: "We may be reminded of the saying 'On serious ground, gather in plunder.' Why then should carriage and transport cause exhaustion on the highways? The answer is that not victuals alone but all sorts of munitions of war have to be conveyed to the army. Besides, the instruction to 'forage on the enemy' only means that when an army is deeply engaged in hostile territory, scarcity of food must be guarded against. So, without being solely dependent on the enemy for corn, we must forage in order that there may be an uninterrupted flow of supplies. Then again, there are places like salt deserts where provisions cannot be got at all, and supplies from home cannot be done without."
As many as seven hundred thousand families will be hindered in their labour.
Commentary: Mei Yao-ch'en says: "Men will be lacking at the plough-tail." The allusion is to the system of dividing land into nine parts, each of about 15 acres, the plot in the centre being cultivated on behalf of the State by the tenants of the other eight. It was here too, so Tu Mu tells us, that their cottages were built and a well sunk, to be used by all in common. (See Chapter Two, verse 12, note.) In time of war one of the families had to serve in the army, while the other seven contributed to its support. So a levy of 100,000 men — reckoning one able-bodied soldier to each family — would affect the husbandry of 700,000 families.
2. Hostile armies may face each other for years, striving for the victory that is decided in a single day. This being so, to remain in ignorance of the enemy's condition simply because one grudges the outlay of a hundred ounces of silver in honours and salaries,
Commentary: "For spies" is of course the meaning, though it would spoil the effect of this curiously elaborate build-up if spies were actually mentioned at this point.
is the height of inhumanity.
Commentary: Sun Tzu's argument is certainly ingenious. He begins by calling attention to the frightful misery and the vast expenditure of blood and treasure that war always brings in its train. Now, unless you are kept informed of the enemy's condition and are ready to strike at the right moment, a war may drag on for years. The only way to get this information is to employ spies, and it is impossible to obtain trustworthy spies unless they are properly paid for their services. But it is surely false economy to grudge a comparatively trifling amount for this purpose, when every day the war lasts eats up an incalculably greater sum. This grievous burden falls on the shoulders of the poor, and so Sun Tzu concludes that to neglect the use of spies is nothing less than a crime against humanity.
3. One who acts like this is no leader of men, no present help to his sovereign, no master of victory.
Commentary: This idea, that the true object of war is peace, has its root in the national temperament of the Chinese. As far back as 597 B.C. these memorable words were uttered by Prince Chuang of the Ch'u State: "The Chinese character for 'prowess' is made up of the characters for 'to stay' and 'a spear' — that is, the cessation of hostilities. Military prowess is seen in the repression of cruelty, the calling in of weapons, the preservation of the appointment of Heaven, the firm establishment of merit, the bestowal of happiness on the people, the making of harmony between the princes, the spreading of wealth."
4. Thus, what enables the wise sovereign and the good general to strike and conquer, and to achieve things beyond the reach of ordinary men, is foreknowledge.
Commentary: That is, knowledge of the enemy's dispositions and of what he means to do.
5. Now this foreknowledge cannot be got out of spirits; it cannot be obtained inductively from experience,
Commentary: Tu Mu's note is: "Knowledge of the enemy cannot be gained by reasoning from other cases like it."
nor by any deductive calculation.
Commentary: Li Ch'uan says: "Quantities like length, breadth, distance and magnitude can be determined exactly by mathematics; human actions cannot be calculated in that way."
6. Knowledge of the enemy's dispositions can only be obtained from other men.
Commentary: Mei Yao-ch'en has rather an interesting note: "Knowledge of the spirit world is to be obtained by divination; information in natural science may be sought by inductive reasoning; the laws of the universe can be verified by mathematical calculation: but the dispositions of an enemy can be found out through spies, and through spies alone."
7. Hence the use of spies, of whom there are five classes: (1) local spies; (2) inward spies; (3) converted spies; (4) doomed spies; (5) surviving spies.
8. When these five kinds of spy are all at work, none can discover the secret system. This is called "divine manipulation of the threads". It is the sovereign's most precious faculty.
Commentary: Cromwell, one of the greatest and most practical of all cavalry leaders, had officers styled "scout masters", whose business it was to collect all possible information about the enemy through scouts and spies and the like; and much of his success in war was traceable to the knowledge of the enemy's moves he gained beforehand in this way.
Footnote: "Aids to Scouting," p. 2.
9. Having local spies means employing the services of the inhabitants of a district.
Commentary: Tu Mu says: "In the enemy's country, win people over by kind treatment, and use them as spies."
10. Having inward spies means making use of officials of the enemy.
Commentary: Tu Mu lists the following classes as likely to do good service in this respect: "Worthy men who have been degraded from office; criminals who have undergone punishment; also favourite concubines who are greedy for gold, men who are aggrieved at being in subordinate positions or who have been passed over in the distribution of posts, others who are anxious that their own side should be defeated so that they may have a chance of displaying their ability and talents, and fickle turncoats who always want to have a foot in each boat. Officials of these several kinds," he goes on, "should be secretly approached and bound to your interests by means of rich presents. In this way you will be able to find out the state of affairs in the enemy's country, learn the plans that are being formed against you, and moreover disturb the harmony and create a breach between the sovereign and his ministers." The need for extreme caution in dealing with "inward spies", however, appears from a historical incident related by Ho Shih: "Lo Shang, Governor of I-Chou, sent his general Wei Po to attack the rebel Li Hsiung of Shu in his stronghold at P'i. After each side had had a number of victories and defeats, Li Hsiung had recourse to the services of a certain P'o-t'ai, a native of Wu-tu. He began by having him whipped until the blood came, and then sent him off to Lo Shang, whom he was to delude by offering to cooperate with him from inside the city and to give a fire signal at the right moment for a general assault. Lo Shang, trusting in these promises, marched out all his best troops and placed Wei Po and others at their head, with orders to attack at P'o-t'ai's bidding. Meanwhile Li Hsiung's general, Li Hsiang, had prepared an ambush on their line of march; and P'o-t'ai, having reared long scaling-ladders against the city walls, now lit the beacon fire. Wei Po's men raced up on seeing the signal and began climbing the ladders as fast as they could, while others were drawn up by ropes lowered from above. More than a hundred of Lo Shang's soldiers entered the city this way, and every one of them was beheaded on the spot. Li Hsiung then charged with all his forces, both inside and outside the city, and routed the enemy completely." (This happened in A.D. 303. I do not know where Ho Shih got the story from. It is not given in the biography of Li Hsiung, nor in that of his father Li T'e, Chin Shu, chapters 120 and 121.)
11. Having converted spies means getting hold of the enemy's spies and using them for our own purposes.
Commentary: That is, detaching them from the enemy's service by means of heavy bribes and liberal promises, and inducing them to carry back false information as well as to spy in turn on their own countrymen. On the other hand, Hsiao Shih-hsien says that we pretend not to have detected the spy, but contrive to let him carry away a false impression of what is going on. Several of the commentators accept this as an alternative definition; but that it is not what Sun Tzu meant is conclusively proved by his later remarks about treating the converted spy generously (verse 21 and following). Ho Shih notes three occasions on which converted spies were used with conspicuous success: (1) by T'ien Tan in his defence of Chi-mo (see above, Chapter Nine, verse 24, note); (2) by Chao She on his march to O-yu (see Chapter Seven, verse 4, note); and (3) by the wily Fan Chu in 260 B.C., when Lien P'o was conducting a defensive campaign against Ch'in. The King of Chao strongly disapproved of Lien P'o's cautious and dilatory methods, which had failed to avert a series of minor disasters, and therefore lent a ready ear to the reports of his spies, who had secretly gone over to the enemy and were already in Fan Chu's pay. They said: "The only thing that causes Ch'in any anxiety is the fear that Chao Kua may be made general. Lien P'o they consider an easy opponent, who is sure to be beaten in the long run." Now this Chao Kua was a son of the famous Chao She. From boyhood he had been wholly engrossed in the study of war and military matters, until at last he came to believe that there was no commander in the whole Empire who could stand against him. His father was much disturbed by this overweening conceit, and by the flippancy with which he spoke of so serious a thing as war, and solemnly declared that if Kua were ever appointed general he would bring ruin on the armies of Chao. This was the man who, in spite of earnest protests from his own mother and from the veteran statesman Lin Hsiang-ju, was now sent to succeed Lien P'o. Needless to say, he proved no match for the redoubtable Po Ch'i and the great military power of Ch'in. He fell into a trap by which his army was divided in two and his communications cut; and after a desperate resistance lasting 46 days, during which the famished soldiers devoured one another, he was himself killed by an arrow, and his whole force, amounting, it is said, to 400,000 men, was ruthlessly put to the sword.
12. Having doomed spies means doing certain things openly for purposes of deception, and allowing our own spies to know of them and report them to the enemy.
Commentary: Tu Yu gives the best exposition of the meaning: "We ostentatiously do things calculated to deceive our own spies, who must be led to believe that they have found them out unnoticed. Then, when these spies are captured in the enemy's lines, they will make an entirely false report, and the enemy will take his measures accordingly, only to find that we do something quite different. The spies will thereupon be put to death." As an example of doomed spies, Ho Shih mentions the prisoners released by Pan Ch'ao in his campaign against Yarkand. (See Chapter Eleven, verse 36, note.) He also refers to T'ang Chien, who in A.D. 630 was sent by T'ai Tsung to lull the Turkish Khan Chieh-li into a false sense of security, until Li Ching was able to deliver a crushing blow against him. Chang Yu says that the Turks took their revenge by killing T'ang Chien, but this is a mistake, for we read in both the Old and the New T'ang History (chapter 58, folio 2, and chapter 89, folio 8, respectively) that he escaped and lived on until 656. Li I-chi played a somewhat similar part in 203 B.C., when he was sent by the King of Han to open peace negotiations with Ch'i. He has certainly more claim to be described as a "doomed spy", for the King of Ch'i, being attacked without warning soon afterwards by Han Hsin, and infuriated by what he took to be Li I-chi's treachery, ordered the unfortunate envoy to be boiled alive.
13. Surviving spies, finally, are those who bring back news from the enemy's camp.
Commentary: This is the ordinary class of spies, properly so called, forming a regular part of the army. Tu Mu says: "Your surviving spy must be a man of keen intellect, though in outward appearance a fool; of shabby exterior, but with a will of iron. He must be active, robust, endowed with physical strength and courage, thoroughly used to all sorts of dirty work, able to endure hunger and cold, and to put up with shame and humiliation." Ho Shih tells the following story of Ta-hsi Wu of the Sui dynasty: "When he was governor of Eastern Ch'in, Shen-wu of Ch'i made a hostile movement on Sha-yuan. The Emperor T'ai Tsu sent Ta-hsi Wu to spy on the enemy. He was accompanied by two other men. All three were on horseback and wore the enemy's uniform. When it was dark they dismounted a few hundred feet from the enemy's camp and stealthily crept up to listen, until they managed to catch the passwords used in the army. Then they got on their horses again and boldly rode through the camp in the guise of night-watchmen; and more than once, happening to come across a soldier who was committing some breach of discipline, they actually stopped to give the culprit a sound cudgelling. In this way they managed to return with the fullest possible information about the enemy's dispositions, and received warm commendation from the Emperor, who as a result of their report was able to inflict a severe defeat on his adversary."
14. Hence it is that with none in the whole army are more intimate relations to be maintained than with spies.
Commentary: Tu Mu and Mei Yao-ch'en point out that the spy is privileged to enter even the general's private sleeping tent.
None should be more liberally rewarded. In no other business should greater secrecy be preserved.
Commentary: Tu Mu gives a graphic touch: all communication with spies should be carried on "mouth to ear". The following remarks on spies may be quoted from Turenne, who made perhaps larger use of them than any commander before him: "Spies are attached to those who give them most; he who pays them ill is never served. They should never be known to anybody, nor should they know one another. When they propose anything very material, secure their persons, or have in your possession their wives and children as hostages for their fidelity. Never communicate anything to them but what is absolutely necessary that they should know."
Footnote: "Marshal Turenne," p. 311.
15. Spies cannot be usefully employed without a certain intuitive sagacity.
Commentary: Mei Yao-ch'en says: "In order to use them, one must know fact from falsehood, and be able to tell honesty from double-dealing." Wang Hsi, taking it differently, thinks rather along the lines of "intuitive perception" and "practical intelligence". Tu Mu strangely refers these qualities to the spies themselves: "Before using spies we must assure ourselves of their integrity of character and of the extent of their experience and skill." But then he goes on: "A brazen face and a crafty disposition are more dangerous than mountains or rivers; it takes a man of genius to see through such a one." So we are left in some doubt as to his real opinion on the passage.
16. They cannot be properly managed without benevolence and straightforwardness.
Commentary: Chang Yu says: "When you have attracted them by substantial offers, you must treat them with absolute sincerity; then they will work for you with all their might."
17. Without subtle ingenuity of mind, one cannot make certain of the truth of their reports.
Commentary: Mei Yao-ch'en says: "Be on your guard against the possibility of spies going over to the enemy's service."
18. Be subtle! Be subtle! And use your spies for every kind of business.
Commentary: Compare Chapter Six, verse 9.
19. If a secret piece of news is divulged by a spy before the time is ripe, he must be put to death together with the man to whom the secret was told.
Commentary: Word for word, the translation here is: "If spy matters are heard before our plans are carried out," and so on. Sun Tzu's main point in this passage is that whereas you kill the spy himself as a punishment for letting the secret out, the object of killing the other man is only, as Ch'en Hao puts it, "to stop his mouth" and prevent the news leaking any further. If it had already been repeated to others, that object would not be gained. Either way, Sun Tzu lays himself open to the charge of inhumanity, though Tu Mu tries to defend him by saying that the man deserves to be put to death, since the spy would certainly not have told the secret unless the other had been at pains to worm it out of him.
20. Whether the object is to crush an army, to storm a city, or to assassinate an individual, it is always necessary to begin by finding out the names of the attendants, the aides-de-camp,
Commentary: The word is literally "visitors", which is equivalent, as Tu Yu says, to "those whose duty it is to keep the general supplied with information" — which naturally requires frequent interviews with him.
the doorkeepers and sentries of the general in command. Our spies must be commissioned to find these out.
Commentary: As the first step, no doubt, towards finding out whether any of these important functionaries can be won over by bribery.
21. The enemy's spies who have come to spy on us must be sought out, tempted with bribes, led away and comfortably housed. So they will become converted spies and available for our service.
22. It is through the information brought by the converted spy that we are able to acquire and employ local and inward spies.
Commentary: Tu Yu says: "Through conversion of the enemy's spies we learn the enemy's condition." And Chang Yu says: "We must tempt the converted spy into our service, because it is he who knows which of the local inhabitants are greedy for gain and which of the officials are open to corruption."
23. It is owing to his information, again, that we can get the doomed spy to carry false tidings to the enemy.
Commentary: Chang Yu says: "because the converted spy knows how the enemy can best be deceived".
24. Lastly, it is by his information that the surviving spy can be used on appointed occasions.
25. The end and aim of spying in all its five varieties is knowledge of the enemy; and this knowledge can only be derived, in the first instance, from the converted spy.
Commentary: As explained in verses 22 to 24. He not only brings information himself, but makes it possible to use the other kinds of spy to advantage.
Hence it is essential that the converted spy be treated with the utmost liberality.
26. Of old, the rise of the Yin dynasty
Commentary: Sun Tzu means the Shang dynasty, founded in 1766 B.C. Its name was changed to Yin by P'an Keng in 1401.
Commentary: Better known as I Yin, the famous general and statesman who took part in Ch'eng T'ang's campaign against Chieh Kuei.
who had served under the Hsia. Likewise, the rise of the Chou dynasty was due to Lü Ya
Commentary: Lu Shang rose to high office under the tyrant Chou Hsin, whom he afterwards helped to overthrow. Popularly known as T'ai Kung, a title bestowed on him by Wen Wang, he is said to have composed a treatise on war, wrongly identified with the Liu T'ao.
who had served under the Yin.
Commentary: There is less precision in the Chinese than I have thought it well to introduce into my translation, and the commentaries on the passage are by no means explicit. But, having regard to the context, we can hardly doubt that Sun Tzu is holding up I Chih and Lu Ya as illustrious examples of the converted spy, or of something closely like it. His suggestion is that the Hsia and Yin dynasties were overthrown because of the intimate knowledge of their weaknesses and shortcomings that these former ministers were able to pass on to the other side. Mei Yao-ch'en appears to resent any such aspersion on these historic names: "I Yin and Lu Ya," he says, "were not rebels against the Government. Hsia could not employ the former, so Yin employed him. Yin could not employ the latter, so Hou employed him. Their great achievements were all for the good of the people." Ho Shih is indignant too: "How should two divinely inspired men such as I and Lu have acted as common spies? Sun Tzu's mention of them simply means that the proper use of the five classes of spies is a matter requiring men of the highest mental calibre, like I and Lu, whose wisdom and capacity qualified them for the task. The words above only emphasise this point." Ho Shih believes, then, that the two heroes are mentioned on account of their supposed skill in the use of spies. But this is very weak.
27. Hence it is only the enlightened ruler and the wise general who will use the highest intelligence of the army for purposes of spying, and thereby they achieve great results.
Commentary: Tu Mu closes with a note of warning: "Just as water, which carries a boat from bank to bank, may also be the means of sinking it, so reliance on spies, while productive of great results, is often the cause of utter destruction."
Spies are a most important element in war, because on them depends an army's ability to move.
Commentary: Chia Lin says that an army without spies is like a man without ears or eyes.